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I. INTRODUCTION 
P ersian Gulf armed conflicts during 1980-88 (the Iran-Iraq conflict) and 1990-91 (the Gulf War between Iraq and the U.N. Coalition after Iraq's 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait) have resulted in environmental degradations 
of Gulf waters and the land and airspace over States party to the conflicts. Perhaps 
the worst of these was what a Time writer called a "Man-Made Hell on Earth"l 
when Iraq dynamited over 550 of 684 producing Kuwaiti oil wells in early 1991 
during the GulfWar.2 
This paper does not address environmental issues related to land and air 
warfare. Rather, the ensuing analysis explores the maritime aspects of these wars, 
i.e. the "Tanker War" in the Persian Gulf during 1980-88, and conflict at sea during 
the Gulf War of 1990-91, in their environmental contexts.3 
In 1983, Iraqi rocket attacks hit Iran's Nowruz offshore drilling facilities, 
causing a 20-million barrel oil spill into the Gulf. Although early reports that the 
slick had equalled the size of Belgium were later discounted, it was big enough to 
threaten Bahraini, Qatari and Saudi desalination plants before strong winds blew 
it offshore and partially dispersed it. Fish imports into the United Arab Emirates 
(U.A.E.) were stopped becuase of oil contamination in the fishing grounds. Iraq 
rejected Iran's request for a partial truce so that oil cappers could try to stop the 
2000-5000 barrels per day flow. The result was that the leakage lasted for nine 
months.4 This may have been in response to Iran's attack on Iraqi oil terminals 
and ports early in the war, which resulted in their closure. There are no reports of 
significant pollution of the Gulf resulting from these attacks.5 In 1986, Iraq 
bombed Iran's Sirri, Lavan and Larak oil terminals, and Iran attacked the neutral 
U.A.E. Abu al-Bakoush oil installations. In none of these cases were there reports 
of significant spillage into the Gulf.6 The next year, U.S. naval forces attacked 
Iranian offshore oil rigs used as an Iranian gunboat base in response to Iran's 
Silkworm missile strike on a reflagged tanker, S.S. Sea Isle City, in Kuwaiti waters. 
There is no report of petroleum spillage on the high seas resulting from either 
attack? 
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Tanker War shipping losses from attacks by both belligerents were another 
source of marine pollution during that conflict. Although most tankers traveled 
in ballast to the Gulf, they and incoming cargo vessels had bunker fuels aboard. 
All outbound ships also had bunkers aboard, and nearly all tankers leaving the 
Gulf departed with a full load. These vessels, as well as inbound and outbound 
cargo ships, were attacked by the belligerents. Iraq and Iran also laid naval mines, 
either initially set adrift or which came loose from their moorings. Several 
merchantmen, among them neutral flagged vessels, were mined. A U.S. warship, 
U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts, was seriously damaged by an Iranian-laid mine in 1988. 
Iraqi aircraft attacked tankers escorted by Iranian warships, and both countries 
conducted land-based air attacks on merchant ships, primarily tankers, of neutral 
flags, some of which were under convoy by neutral warships. Iran used its surface 
navy to attack these vessels as well. The U.N. Security Council twice condemned 
these attacks and the result on the environment. In 1987, an Iraqi Mirage I aircraft 
mistakenly launched two airborne Exocet missiles at, and seriously damaged, the 
U.S. warship, U.S.S. Stark. Another source of marine pollution came from losses 
of naval vessels, principally those of Iran, hit as self-defense measures following 
attacks on U.S. naval vessels. The conflict was a major war, not a small one, 
particularly when the commitments ofIran and Iraq were measured. For the only 
time since World War II, deliberate, sustained operations were carried out against 
merchant ships.8 Iran and Iraq attacked more than 400 merchantmen, sinking 31 
with 50 more declared total losses. Write-off losses stood at nearly half the World 
War II tonnage sunk.9 The Second World War lasted for just under six years. The 
Iran-Iraq War ground on for eight years. The reason for the disparity between the 
relatively small number of ships lost and the huge tonnage losses is, of course, the 
larger displacement of merchant vessels in the 1980s. The possible result when a 
tanker was attacked during 1980-88 was the risk of a considerably larger oil spill 
for each ship attacked than during World War II. 
Ten days after the U.N. Security Council-authorized Coalition action to drive 
Iraq out of Kuwait began during the Gulf War, 10 Iraq opened valves of its Mina 
al-Bakr offshore terminal and occupied-Kuwait's Sea Island terminal. Iraq also 
dumped oil from five tankers at Mina al-Bakr. From 3 to 16 million barrels of oil 
flowed into the upper Gulf. When the oil reached Arabian peninsula shores, 
thousands of migratory birds died in the muck. Fishing grounds were ruined. The 
food chain for all forms of Gulf wildlife was interrupted. Beaches were made 
unusable for the tourist industry. Saudi desalination plants, which supplied the 
civil population and Coalition military forces with drinking water, were 
threatened. Coalition air forces stopped the flood by bombing the pumping 
stations. 11 
There was little destruction of merchant shipping during the 1990-91 Gulf War. 
The U.N. embargo and authorizations for interception and diversion ofIraq-bound 
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vessels did not result in any attacks.12 Only a few Coaltion warships were damaged, 
mostly by mines, and although Iraqi naval forces were destroyed, they were mostly 
small ships. Most vessel-source pollution came from the Mina al-Bakr tankers.13 
As both conflicts make clear, if the belligerents who initiated environmental 
degradation had hoped to improve their fortunes on the battlefield by these tactics, 
any optimism went a-glimmering. The Iran-Iraq war wore on for five more years 
before ending in mid-1988. The Iraqi attack on Nowruz was not a war-stopper, 
and leakage from stricken merchantmen did not even receive media attention. 
Similarly, blasting oil wells and dumping Kuwaiti crude into the upper Gulf 
during the 1990-91 war did not influence events appreciably.14 
Although environmental damage and restoration were not as long-lasting as 
first predicted, the economic loss was staggering. IS Oil spills and resulting slicks 
dwarfed the size of previous accidental spills. Perhaps 24 times as much oil as was 
released in the 1989 grounding of Exxon Valdez in Alaska's Prince William Sound, 
went into the Gulf because of Iraq's actions in 1991.16 The 1978 allision and 
breakup of Amoco Cadiz resulted in a spill a fourth or less of Iraq's deliberate 
discharge in 1991.17 There is no account of how much leaked from damaged or 
sunken ships during the Tanker War, but since many merchantmen that were hit 
carried petroleum, it may have been considerable. Damaged or sunken warships 
undoubtedly leaked bunkers into the Gulf.1S 
The foregoing survey does not include oil going overboard in deballasting or 
from land-based sources not connected with armed conflict. Worldwide figures 
for this pollution rose from about a million metric tons annually in the 19608 to 
nearly 7 million tons in 1973, with over half from land-based sources and 35 
percent from ships. Two-thirds of the latter have been said to be from "routine 
tanker operations.,,19 
Environmental degradation during international armed conflict is not a new 
phenomenon. Pollution of the sea on a measurable scale during warfare at sea has 
largely been an aspect of Twentieth Century conflicts, particularly after oil 
replaced coal as the primary source of energy for steam-powered ships, and the 
world began to consume petroleum as the primary fuel for transportation, as a 
major source for heating, and an ingredient for plastics and other products. The 
Persian Gulf has been a particularly busy highway for transporting petroleum, 
since a high percentage of the Earth's proven reserves are within the territories of 
States bordering the Gulf. The problem of pollution of the oceans is not ne~o or 
confined to the Gulf. However, the recent Gulf wars have merely underscored 
issues that have arisen on a worldscale basis, usually in the context of accidents 
through collisions or groundings of tankers. These accidents, like the loss of 
R.M.S. Titanic in 1912 and the resulting 1914 Convention for Safety of Life at Sea,2l 
have tended to be catalysts for treaties or other action to prevent recurrences.22 
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The world little noted warnings of the potential for environmental degradation 
of the seas before, during and after the Tanker War.23 However, there were 
numerous claims that Iraq had violated existing international norms, notably 
those in the Environmental Modification Convention24 and Additional Protocol 
125 to the Geneva Conventions of1949,26 which declare principles of humanitarian 
law during armed conflict. The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 687, 
declaring Iraq "liable under international law for any direct damage, including 
environmental damage and in depletion of natural resources, or ... injury as a 
result of [its ] unlawful invasion and occupation ofKuwait.,,27 There were also calls 
in the United Nations and other quarters for action in the form of additionaUegal 
protections, e.g., a Fifth or "Green" Geneva Convention to protect the 
environment during armed conflict.28 The latter efforts largely came to naught, 
primarily because participants concluded that no new agreements were necessary 
if existing ones were enforced.29 The question of belligerents' culpability for 
environmental damage during international armed conflict at sea remains as a 
possible source of rhetoric, if not law, in future conflicts. Publication of the San 
Remo Manual in 1995 30 demonstrates that the issue remains alive in 
commentators' minds, as does this Symposium. 
This paper is a partial summary of principal findings of my research on this 
complex subject and is limited to the law of the sea, the oceans environment and 
how these sometimes overlapping bodies oflaw relate to the law of armed conflict 
at sea, i.e. the law of naval warfare. Land-based aspects of environmental issues 
(e.g., transborder air pollution), and problems related exclusively to land warfare 
or air warfare above the land, are not discussed. 
II. The Law of the Maritime Environment, the Law of the Sea, and the 
Law of Naval Warfare 
There is an enormous volume oflaw related to the maritime environment, most 
of it in treaties appearing since the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the 
Sea.31 If international agreements related to conservation of marine resources32 or 
maritime safety3 are considered, insofar as observing these standards would 
promote a better oceans environment, there were scattered efforts at protection of 
the oceans well before 1958. The same is true with respect to the law of naval 
warfare, where treaties negotiated to regulate aspects of warfare or humanitarian 
principles to be observed during war derivatively benefit the environment, 
particularly when conflict at sea has impact ashore. Agreements of this nature 
include the 1907 Hague Conventions dealing with shore bombardment and mine 
warfare34; the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, whose prohibitions on gas and 
bacteriological warfare affect human and nonhuman inhabitants of the 
environment35; the 1935 Roerich Pact36 protecting monuments, etc., ashore; parts 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions37; and the 1954 Hague Cultural Property 
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Convention,38 which provides inter alia for safe sealift of protected objects. There 
is thus as deep a legacy of what today are called environmental concerns in the law 
of armed conflict as those agreements dealing with pollution or species protection, 
which today might be lumped under the same rubric. 
The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea39 is the first worldwide 
multilateral agreement attempting to deal comprehensively with maritime 
environmental problems. For those countries that are or become parties,40 the 
Convention will replace the 1958 LOS Conventions.41 Bahrain 'lind Iraq ratified 
it in 1985, and Kuwait in 1986; many other countries, e.g. France and the U.A.E., 
were signatories, but other States with prominent roles in the Gulf wars-e.g., the 
United Kingdom and the United States-were not signatories or parties during 
the Tanker War or the 1990-91 conflict.42 Thus, for some States there was an 
obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the Convention during part of 
these confrontations,43 and others were bound by the custom the Convention 
restated.44 
The Convention has different provisions dealing with the welter of custom and 
treaties affecting the maritime environment; it continues 1958 convention 
provisions stating the relationship between the law of the sea and the law of armed 
conflict and its component, the law of naval warfare.4S 
A. The Relationship Between the 1982 LOS Convention and Other 
Environmental Treaties 
The 1982 LOS Convention will be an effective ifmild trumping device-much 
as the U.N. Charter, Article 103, declares that Charter norms supersede those of 
all other treaties 46 -for agreements related to maritime environmental protection, 
whether already in force or to come into force, which may have special terms but 
which "should be carried out in a manner consistent with the general principles 
and objectives of [the] Convention.,,47 This is slightly different from Article 
311(2), the general supersession provision for the Convention, which declares that 
it does not alter existing rights "which arise from other agreements compatible 
with this Convention" and which do not affect enjoyment of other parties' rights 
or performance of their obligations.48 The upshot is that all agreements in place 
or to be negotiated, if related to the generally-stated environmental norms of the 
Convention, must conform to these Convention norms.49 
Reading of Part XII of the 1982 LOS Convention,SO as well as many references 
to environmental standards scattered elsewhere throughout the document,Sl 
demonstrates that specifics are more often found in other agreements, perhaps 
bilateral, and frequently regional in recent years. The latter have been often 
sponsored by the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), which developed after 
the Stockholm 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment.52 Examples 
of these include two that are particularly relevant to this analysis, the 1978 Kuwait 
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Regional Convention and ProtocolS3 and the 1982 Red Sea Convention and 
Protoco1.S4 Although the Persian Gulf was the principal theater of maritime 
military operations during the 1990-91 Gulf war, there were many Coalition 
interceptions of Iraq-bound merchantmen in the Red Sea, and some missile and 
air strikes were launched from there. S5 In many instances, detailed regulations are 
developed by administrative bodies established by the treaties.56 This procedure 
is contemplated in the 1982 LOS Convention.57 
There is the possibility, of course, that a parallel but contradictory custom58 or 
other source of law may develop alongside Convention-based norms.59 The 
developing customary norm might be the same as, and thereby strengthen, the 
Convention norm.60 If in opposition, the custom will weaken the treaty norm.61 
However, no treaty, and probably no custom, can supersede the U.N. Charter, 
mandatory norms developed under it,62 orjus cogens norms.63 
B. "Other Rules" Clauses in the Conventions 
Both the 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions include clauses, sometimes 
overlooked in analysis or commentary, stating that rights under these agreements 
are subject to "other rules of international law" as well as terms in the particular 
convention.64 For example, Article 87(1) of the 1982 LOS Convention, which 
declares high seas freedoms, also says that "Freedom of the high seas is exercised 
under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of 
internationallaw.,,6S Four conclusions can be stated. 
First, the overwhelming majority of commentators-including the 
International Law Commission, a U.N. General Assembly agency ofinternational 
law experts66 -have stated that the "other rules" clauses in the 1958 and 1982 LOS 
Conventions refer to the law of armed conflict,67 a component of which is the law 
of naval warfare. Therefore, provisions such as Article 88 of the 1982 LOS 
Convention state a truism-i.e. that the high seas are reserved for peaceful 
purposes68 -but high seas usage can be subject to the law of naval warfare, when 
Article 87(1)'s other rules clause is read with Article 88. As in the case of the 1958 
conventions, 
That provision does not preclude ... use of the high seas by naval forces. Their use 
for aggressive purposes, which would ... violat[e] ... Article 2(4) of the [U.N.] 
Charter ... , is forbidden as well by Article 88 [ofthe Convention]. See also LOS 
Convention, Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights and 
p[er]forming their duties under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use of 
force in violation of the Charter.69 
This analysis is buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no treaty can 
supersede the Charter.1° Thus, the peaceful purposes language in Article 88 and 
other provisions of the Convention 71 cannot override Charter norms, such as those 
Walker 191 
in Article 2(4), but also those in Article 51, i.e. the "inherent right of individual 
and collective self-defense."n 
Second, there is no indication that the LOS Convention drafters thought that 
the other rules clauses refer to anything else, and particularly to any customary 
law of the environment. International environmental law was a mere gleam in 
academics' and futurists' eyes when the 1958 LOS Conventions were signed, with 
only a patchwork of international agreements on the subject,13 and there is no 
indication that the International Law Commission considered the issue. By 
contrast, there was an established body of law dealing with armed conflict 
situations, including naval warfare, at the time. 
Third, other agreements dealing with protection of the maritime environment 
include clauses exempting, or partially exempting, their application during armed 
conflict or similar situations. Some speak of war,74 others armed conflict or the 
need to protect vital national interests?5 This includes the recently-ratified North 
American Free Trade Agreement?6 This tends to confirm the view of applying 
the law of armed conflict as a separate body of law in appropriate situations. To 
the extent that treaties dealing with the maritime environment do not have such 
clauses,77 such agreements must beread in the light of the LOS conventions, which 
include such provisions. And to the extent that the 1958 LOS conventions today 
recite customary norms-and such is the case with the High Seas 
Convention 78 -applying the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) as a separate body of 
law in appropriate situations as a customary norm must also be considered with 
LOAC treaties and other sources79 when analyzing environmental issues in this 
context. 
Fourth, principles of the law of treaties-e.g., impossibility of performance,80 
fundamental change of circumstances,81 or war, the last applying only to parties 
to a conflict82 -may suspend operation of international agreements during a 
conflict or other emergency situation, or may terminate them. The outbreak of 
hostilities obviously does not suspend or terminate humanitarian conventions 
designed to apply in armed conflict.83 The other side of the coin is the policy of 
pacta sunt servanda, i.e., treaties should be observed,84 and one manifestation of this 
principle is that States signing treaties should not behave so as to defeat their object 
and purpose.85 The often-amorphous law of treaty succession86 must be 
considered, particularly with respect to older agreements, including those stating 
the law of armed conflict, to the extent that such treaties are not part of customary 
law today.87 If these agreements restate custom, and are subject to treaty succession 
principles with respect to a particular country, that country is doubly bound.88 
The conclusion is inescapable that the other rules clauses of the 1958 
Conventions-provisions that were carried forward into the 1982 LOS 
Convention-mean that the terms of the Conventions are subject to the law of 
armed conflict, of which the law of naval warfare is a part. Since the 1958 High 
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Seas Convention is generally regarded as a restatement of customary law, its other 
rules clauses 3:re part of the customary norms governing oceans law during armed 
conflict. 
C. The 1982 LOS Convention and the Maritime Environment 
Although the Convention is prolix on the subject of the environment, the 
changes it proposes are neither great nor radical; it takes a holistic approach.89 
The core of marine environmental standards are in Part XII, which establishes for 
the first time a comprehensive legal framework for protecting and preserving the 
marine environment.90 Other Convention provisions deal with environmental 
issues91 in the context of specific ocean areas. 
1. Part XII of the Convention 
Part XII begins by declaring that "States have the obligation to protect and 
preserve the marine environment.,,92 The Convention does not define "marine 
environment," but the negotiators generally understood that the atmosphere is 
included where relevant.93 It also includes living resources, marine ecosystems 
and sea water quality.94 The Convention defmes "pollution of the marine 
environment"; it 
... means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy 
into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result 
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to 
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and the legitimate 
uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.95 
The Convention also declares that States' "sovereign right to exploit their 
natural resources" pursuant to national environmental policies in, e.g., the EEZ, 
is subject to a "duty to preserve and protect the marine environment,,96 against 
significant97 damage. 
States must act individually and jointly to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
of the marine environment from any source, using best practicable means at their 
disposal, in accordance with their capabilities. They must harmonize national 
policies, i.e., national laws, with this requirement.98 In doing so, they must ensure 
that they do not damage other States or their environment by pollution, or that 
pollution does not spread beyond their areas of sovereignty or control,99 e.g" the 
EEZ, as well as the territorial sea.IOO Required measures include those designed 
to minimize to the greatest possible extent releasing toxic, harmful or noxious 
substances, especially those that are persistent, from land-based sources, from or 
through the atmosphere or by dumpinglOI; pollution from vessels, including 
accident prevention measures, dealing with emergencies, safety at sea, preventing 
discharges, and regulating design, construction, equipping, operating and 
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manning vessels; pollution from installations for exploring or exploiting natural 
resources of the seabed and subsoil; pollution from other installations operating 
in the marine environment.102 In so acting, States must refrain from unjustifiable 
interference with other States' exercising their Convention rights and duties.103 
Measures taken must include those necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile 
ecosystems and habitats of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other 
marine life.104 In combatting pollution, States must not act to transfer damage or 
hazards from one area to another, or to transfer one type of pollution into 
another. lOS Technologies that alter or harm the environment, or introduce new or 
alien species that would significantly harm the environment must be avoided.106 
There are two distinct duties: avoiding use of harmful technologies, and 
"maintain[ing] the natural state of the marine environment," the latter an 
innovation in internationallaw.107 
The Convention requires enviro~mental cooperation on global and regional 
bases. lOS Other provisions require cooperation in scientific research and in 
establishing scientific criteria for rules for pollution prevention, reduction and 
controI.109 States must also monitor, publish and assess the marine environment 
and provide scientific and technical assistance, with preference for developing 
States,uo A State must notify other countries and competent international 
organizations (e.g., the International Maritime Organization, IMO) of actual or 
imminent pollution damage to the environment.lll Notification is a rule of 
customary international law. 112 Notice "also envisages that a notified State may 
wish to take preventive action to avert damage to itse1f."U3 States must jointly 
develop and promote contingency plans to combat pollution, cooperating with 
international organizations within limits of their capabilities.114 
The Convention establishes standards for international rules and national laws 
to combat pollution. US States must adopt measures at least as effective as 
international rules and standards to prevent, reduce and control pollution from 
land-based sources; seabed activities, artificial islands and installations subject to 
"national jurisdiction;" the Area; and vessels of their registry or flag.U6 The 
phrase "national jurisdiction" includes internal waters, the territorial sea, the 
EEZ, the continental shelf and archipelagic waters.U7 
Similar principles govern ocean dumping. us Dumping in another State's 
territorial sea, EEZ or continental shelf waters requires the coastal State's express 
prior approval; it may regulate such dumping after consulting with other affected 
countries,u9 
Although some drafters thought that emergency fuel discharge from aircraft 
might not be an exception to prohibitions on ocean dumping without prior express 
approval, eventually the conclusion was that general international law allows such 
onforce majeure or distress theories as an exception to treaty compliance.120 What 
is true for aircraft is also true for ships; distress and force majeure theories are 
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recognized for innocent passage and straits transit passage regimes. Distress and 
force majeure can be valid claims during armed conflict situations, with different 
rules applying in relationships among States not party to a conflict, relationships 
between belligerents and States not party to a conflict, and relationships between 
belligerents.121 
States must harmonize national policies at regionallevelsl22 and must work at 
the global level to establish rules, standards and recommended practices and 
procedures.123 
2. Controlling Pollution and Protecting the Environment in Specific Ocean Areas 
The 1982 Convention, Part XII, also recites standards related to specific ocean 
areas, e.g., the territorial sea. In some cases, e.g. the contiguous zone, there is no 
reference in Part XII. 
The Convention has special rules for controlling pollution from vessels in the 
territorial sea. States may publish special rules for foreign-flag ships' entry into 
port or internal waters, after due notice. These can be cooperative arrangements. 
States may adopt special rules for foreign-flag vessels within their territorial sea, 
including ships in innocent passage. However, no special rule can hamper 
innocent passage.124 
These provisions are consistent with the Convention's navigational articles, 
which declare that passage is considered prejudicial to the coastal State's peace, 
good order or security if a foreign-flag ship "engages in ... any act of wilful and 
serious pollution contrary to [the] Convention[,]" and which allows the coastal 
State to adopt regulations, "in conformity with ... this Convention and other rules 
of international law, relating to innocent passage ... in respect of •.. conservation 
of the living resources of the sea [and] ... preservation of the environment of the 
coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof .•. " 
with due notice of such rules. Foreign ships must comply with these rules.125 
Tankers, nuclear-powered ships and vessels carrying nuclear or other inherently 
dangerous or noxious substances or materials may be required to confine their 
passage to sea lanes established by the littoral State. These ships must also observe 
any special precautions stated in international agreements.126 As in other 
circumstances, coastal States cannot hamper innocent passage except pursuant to 
the Convention. In applying regulations adopted in accordance with it, the 
practical effect cannot be to deny or impair innocent passage. There can be no 
discrimination in form or fact against any State's ships or against vessels carrying 
cargo to, from or for any State.127 
However, coastal States may act to prevent breach of conditions attached to port 
calls or passage to internal waters. Moreover, they may temporarily suspend 
innocent passage in specific areas of their territorial sea if essential for protecting 
their security after duly published notice of a suspension.128 While this might 
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arguably allow suspension for "environmental security" reasons, such is not the 
case. Repetition from the Territorial Sea Convention,129 and the 1982 
Convention's drafting history,B° point to a different view. The right of temporary 
suspension balances between a coastal State's right to protect its territorial 
integrity through legitimate self-defense measures 131 and rights of navigation, etc., 
under the territorial sea innocent passage regime. How protecting a coastal State's 
environment fits into the analysis is a different issue. 
The same territorial sea rules for criminal and civil jurisdiction, and for 
immunity of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial 
purposes, also apply to environment-related claims. For example, warships that 
do not comply with valid coastal State environmental regulations can only be 
required to leave the territorial sea immediately. Flag States are responsible under 
international law for loss or damage caused by their warships or other 
noncommercial vessels.132 The Convention's innocent passage rules, insofar as 
they concern environmental protection, are also subject to "other rules of 
international law," i.e., the law of naval warfare.133 
The Convention's innocent passage rules apply to straits for which innocent 
passage rights obtain and to archipelagic waters passage.134 If a country qualifying 
as an archipelagic State declares archipelagic sea lanes and air routes and they are 
adopted by the appropriate international organization (i.e. IMO),135 duties of ships 
and aircraft regarding the oceans environment, authorization for the archipelagic 
State to adopt laws, and the requirement that the right of passage shall not be 
hampered or suspended applicable to straits transit passage, attach to archipelagic 
sea lanes passage. A difference between straits innocent passage and archipelagic 
innocent passage, whether lanes have been declared or not, is that archipelagic 
States may suspend innocent passage for security reasons as under the territorial 
sea regime, while straits innocent passage is nonsuspendable.136 Although coastal 
States may take appropriate enforcement measures against vessels "causing or 
threatening major damage" to the straits environment because they have violated 
navigational safety, maritime traffic or environmental laws while in transit passage 
(the regime for most straits), this does not apply to warships or other vessels 
entitled to sovereign immunity.137 
Article 33 of the Convention, permitting a contiguous zone, does not 
specifically mention environmental protection. It allows declaration of such a 
zone, which, if no EEZ has been claimed, is a high seas area contiguous to the 
territorial sea but no wider than 24 miles from territorial sea baselines. The coastal 
State may exercise control in the zone to prevent infringement of its customs, 
fiscal, immigration or sanitary (i.e., health or quarantine) laws and to punish 
violations committed within the territorial sea.138 It is conceivable that 
environmental protection claims could be made with respect to health law 
enforcement, but this has not been the traditional view of the zone's purpose.139 
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Article 33 is tied to Article 303 of the Convention, which sets standards for 
archeological and historical objects found at sea.140 "Found at sea" seems to have 
a more comprehensive scope than "found in the marine environment." Another 
problem with Article 303 is that there is no agreed definition of the terms 
"archaeological" and "historical.,,141 Article 303 says that its terms are also 
"without prejudice to other international agreements and rules of international 
law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical 
nature,,,142 a variant on the "other rules" clauses that make the Convention subject 
to the law of armed conflict in appropriate situations.143 In internal waters, the 
territorial sea and archipelagic waters, coastal State law governs as to artifacts 
found there; beyond, out to the Area, i.e., the deep seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction or sovereignty, Article 303 controls but does not accord sovereign 
rights. 144 Objects found in the Area must be preserved or disposed offor the benefit 
of humankind, with "particular regard" for the State of origin,14S if that can be 
determined. 
Consistent with the Convention's navigational articles,l46 as in the case of the 
territorial sea, coastal States may adopt special laws for their EEZs.147 Although 
there is no explicit cross-reference to Convention continental shelf principles in 
this Part XII provision, clearly the coastal State has the same kind of 
environmental rights and responsibilities with regard to activities on its 
continental shelf where shelf sovereignty has been declared with no claim for an 
EEZ.148 For both the EEZ and the continental shelf, coastal States must have due 
regard for other oceans users' high seas rights, including navigation and 
overflight.149 Both are subjectto sovereign immunity exceptions for, e.g., warships, 
and the "other rules of international law" principle, in connection with coastal 
State environmental regulation.1SO 
Provisions allowing coastal State regulation of pollution from vessels in the 
territorial sea, the EEZ and above the continental shelf are considered an 
"innovation for the general law of the sea," which usually has looked to flag or 
registry States to control pollution from ships. lSI Whether considered lex lata or 
de lege ferenda today, these innovative provisions are subject to qualifications: there 
must be a balance of due regard for others' high seas rights, e.g., freedoms of 
navigation or overflight; warships and other non-commercial vessels retain 
sovereign immunity; and any attempt at environmental regulation of these sea 
areas is subject to law of armed conflict principles in appropriate situations 
through the "other rules" clauses. 
The 1982 Convention also provides for enforcing environmental standards. 
States must adopt laws implementing international norms for land-based 
pollution, pollution from seabed activities, ocean dumping, and through or from 
the atmosphere.1S2 The pollution hazard must be significant.1S3 
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States in whose port a vessel, suspected of polluting that State's internal or 
territorial waters or EEZ, in violation of international standards, is located, may 
investigate, detain or begin enforcement against that ship. These rights are subject 
to, e.g., notice to the flag or registry State, nondiscriminatory enforcement, and 
enforcement only through State vessels, e.g., warships or vessels on authorized 
government service.154 Enforcing States may not endanger safety of navigation or 
create a hazard to an accused vessel, bring it to an unsafe port or anchorage, or 
expose the marine environment to "an unreasonable risk.,,155 A detaining State is 
liable for unlawful enforcement measures, excessive "in the light of available 
information" at the time.156 The Convention also provides in Article 221 that 
1. Nothing ... prejudice[s] the right of States, pursuant to international law, both 
customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea 
proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related 
interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a 
maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be 
expected to result in major harmful consequences. 
2 .... "[M]aritime casualty" means a collision of vessels, stranding or other incident 
of navigation, or other occurrence on board a vessel or external to it resulting in 
material damage or imminent threat of material damage to a vessel or cargo. 
Measures to be taken under Art. 221(1) include destruction of the vessel. These 
provisions, found in other widely-accepted pollution prevention conventions,157 
may be close to acceptance as customary international law, if such is not already 
the case. ISS Such a right of intervention would have justified Persian Gulf 
countries' acting to prevent oil pollution damage from the attacks on oil terminal 
facilities or vessels during the Tanker War,159 assuming there was a threat within 
the Convention definition, and that the leakage resulting from the attacks was a 
"casualty" within the meaning of Article 221(2), i.e., an "occurrence on board a 
vessel or external to it resulting in, or imminent threat, of material damage to a 
vessel or cargo." The provisions may not have applied to Iran and Iraq in that war 
because of the "other rules" clauses of the LOS Conventions, applicable at least as 
customary law,160 but as between Persian Gulf States not party to the conflict and 
either belligerent, or as between States not party to the war, the law of the sea 
applied in this context. Since U.N. Security Council resolutions at least 
theoretically involved all countries around the Gulf during the 1990-91 conflict, 
LOS principles allowing intervention may have gone by the boards because of the 
other rules clauses as to the Iraq-initiated spill from the Kuwaiti port.161 To the 
extent that Article 221 would apply as a customary norm, it supplied additional 
justification for Coalition attacks to stop the discharge. 
In the context of the Convention's enforcement provisions, here too warships, 
naval auxiliaries and other vessels or aircraft on government non-commercial 
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service may not be detained and have sovereign immunity; this is qualified by 
requiring flag States to ensure, by adopting "appropriate measures" not impairing 
operations or operational capabilities of such ships or aircraft, that they operate 
consistently, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with the Convention. This 
policy repeats other Convention immunity rules except for the "appropriate 
measures" qualification.162 It 
... acknowledges that military vessels and aircraft are unique platforms not always 
adaptable to conventional environmental technologies and equipment because of 
weight and space limitations, harsh operating conditions, the requirements of 
long-term sustainability, or other security considerations .... [S]ecurity needs may 
limit compliance with disclosure requirements.163 
Some regional environmental protection agreements either omit164 a 
declaration of the customary immunity rule or do not append the 1982 LOS 
Convention's limitations and requirements for appropriate measures. The Kuwait 
Regional Convention and the Red Sea Convention are examples of the latter.165 
To the extent that the Convention binds treaty partners in a given context, those 
treaties must be considered modified to that extent. 166 To the extent that the LOS 
Convention restates customary law, the longstanding principle of warship and 
naval auxiliary immunity167 is a powerful factor for its application in these 
contexts as well. 
Other divisions of the 1982 LOS Convention providing for environmental 
protection independently of Part XII include those dealing with vessel accidents 
on the high seas, high seas fishing, and the Area, also a part of the high seas, and 
marine scientific research. The Convention's high seas fishing provisions follow 
in part those of the 1958 conventions, but rules for the Area are unique to the 1982 
Convention. Because there has been little technology capable of exploiting that 
part of the ocean, and because the Convention has only recently come into force, 
these provisions are presently largely theoretical in nature. Nevertheless, they are 
likely to have impact in the next century, and many restate concepts in other ocean 
areas regulated by the Convention. 
The Convention requires more of flag States as to ships under their registry and 
operating on the high seas. Flag States must ensure "that the master, officers and, 
to the extent appropriate, the crew are fully conversant with and required to 
observe the applicable international regulations concerning ••. prevention, 
reduction and control of marine pollution .... ,,168 The Convention also requires 
States to "cause an inquiry to be held ... into every marine casualty or incident of 
navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and causing [inter 
alia] ... serious damage ... to the marine environment. The flag State and the 
other State shall co-operate in the conduct of any inquiry ... into any such marine 
casualty or incident of navigation.,,169 
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There is a duty among States bordering semi-enclosed areas, i.e., a gulf or other 
body surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean 
by a narrow outlet, such as the Persian Gulf, to coordinate managing, conserving, 
exploring and exploiting oceanic living resources, and to coordinate implementing 
their rights and duties as to protecting and preserving the marine environment.170 
Marine scientific research is recognized as a high seas right in the 1982 
Convention,l71 but such operations must be conducted in compliance with 
relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention including those 
protecting and preserving the marine environment. In 
Although high seas fisherfolk retain the traditional freedom to seek their 
catch,173 the Convention seines in that right to a certain extent, as it has been 
under earlier treaties and practice. It "has never been an unfettered right.,,174 The 
Convention explicitly subjects high seas fishing rights to limiting treaties, and to 
cooperation in achieving agreements, as well as rules it sets for certain fish stocks 
and on conserving high seas living resources.17S To the extent that these treaties 
impose environmental controls, the high seas freedom to fish is curtailed. The 
same is true for conservation measures imposed by coastal States or agreements. 
Although the Convention imposes a due regard formula on concurrent exercise 
of high seas freedoms such as navigation, overflight and fishing,176 this formula 
does not apply to environmental concerns.l77 The only indirect exception is the 
due regard requirement for Area activities,178 which might include environmental 
controls. 
The Area-defined as the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil beyond national 
jurisdictional limits 179 -and its resources are declared the common heritage of 
humankind.180 National jurisdiction means, inter alia, a declared EEZ or 
continental shelf. The legal status of the water column or airspace above the Area 
is not affected by Convention provisions dealing with it.181 Area governance is 
vested in an Authority,182 which must adopt rules and procedures for preventing, 
reducing and controlling pollution and other hazards to the marine environment, 
including coastlines, interfering with the ecological balance of that environment, 
with particular attention being paid to protection from harmful effects of activities 
such as drilling, dredging, excavation, waste disposal, building and operating or 
maintaining installations, pipelines and other devices. These rules must also 
protect and conserve Area natural resources and prevent damage to flora and fauna 
of the marine environment. The Authority must take necessary measures, which 
may supplement existing treaties, to protect human life, in connection with Area 
operations.183 There is also an obligation to preserve objects of an archaeological 
and historical nature found in the Area, with particular regard paid to preferential 
rights of a State or country of origin, and which incorporates by reference other 
rules oflaw and agreements dealing with artifacts protection. 184 The Convention 
also requires that Area activities be undertaken" with reasonable regard for other 
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activities in the marine environment." Area installations, like those in the EEZ 
and on the continental shelf, inter alia must not be established "where interference 
may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international 
navigation or in areas ofintense fishing activity .... Other activities in the marine 
environment shall be conducted with reasonable regard for activities in the 
Area.,,185 
Convention provisions for the Area include an "other rules of international 
law" clause: 
The general conduct of States in relation to the Area shall be in accordance with the 
provisions of this Part [XI], the principles embodied in the [U.N.] Charter ... and 
other rules ofinternationallaw in the interests of maintaining peace and security and 
promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding.186 
As in the case of the high seas generally, the Convention declares that the Area 
shall only be used for peaceful purposes.187 The same interpretations should obtain 
for application of these articles as analyzed under other parts of the 1982 
Convention and its 1958 antecedents.188 "Other rules" means the law of armed 
conflict may be applied in certain contexts. The "peaceful purposes" provision 
means that no State can take any action, e.g., aggression, in violation of the Charter. 
Peaceful activities under Area rules include military activities, e.g., naval task force 
operations.189 
3. RegionalAgreements, the 1982 LOS Convention, and the Law of Armed Conflict at 
Sea 
The Kuwait Regional Convention, to which all Persian Gulf countries are party, 
including Iran and Iraq, covers the entire Gulf, except for bordering States' 
internal waters. Similarly, the Red Sea Convention's geographic sweep includes 
that body and the Gulf of Aden, again excepting bordering States' internal 
waters.190 Both define "marine pollution" in nearly identical terms as 
introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environment resulting or likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living 
resources, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities including fishing, 
impairment of [the] quality of use for use of [the] sea and reduction of amenities[.]191 
Parties pledge cooperation to prevent, abate and combat pollution of the marine 
environment in the Gulf or the Red Sea, whether caused by ships, dumping from 
ships or aircraft, from exploring and exploiting the territorial sea and its subsoil 
and the continental shelf, or land reclamation activities.192 The Conventions' 
Protocols amplify this pledge.193 The latter include broad definitions of "marine 
emergency" to trigger application; it means 
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... any casualty, incident, occurrence or situation, however caused, resulting in 
substantial pollution or imminent threat of substantial pollution to the marine 
environment by oil or other harmful substances and includes, inter alia, collisions, 
strandings and other incidents involving ships, including tankers, blow-outs arising 
from petroleum drilling and production activities, and the presence of oil or other 
harmful substances arising from the failure of industrial installations[.]194 
These Conventions and Protocols do not explicitly provide for anticipatory 
self-defense against imminent pollution threats, as does the 1982 LOS 
Convention.195 However, the Protocols appear to contemplate such by allowing 
"every appropriate measure to combat pollution and/or to rectify the situation," 
provided that other countries are notifiedl96 of emergency responses, defined as 
"any activity intended to prevent, mitigate or eliminate pollution by oil or other 
harmful substances or threat of such pollution resulting from marine 
emergencies.,,197 This broad grant of authority must be tempered by the 
limitations of proportionality, etc., stated in the 1982 Convention.198 This 
Convention language further justifies, subject to notice and proportionality 
principles, the concept of anticipatory reaction to imminent threat. And if this be 
so, might such be further support for the concept of anticipatory self-defense?199 
These regional treaties had applications during the Tanker War and the 1990-91 
conflict. The Red Sea Convention and Protocol did not apply to the 1980-88 war, 
except as being supportive of common principles in the Kuwait Convention and 
Protocol, which did apply, geographically,200 to the Persian Gulf. 
There were two belligerents in the Tanker War, Iran and Iraq. The Kuwait 
Convention and its Protocol could not have applied per se as between them, either 
because of application of the other rules principles of the law of the sea,201 or 
because of law of treaties principles such as impossibility of performance, 
fundamental change of circumstances or armed conflict between them, all of which 
are grounds for suspending international agreements.202 However, except insofar 
as the latter grounds would apply as between belligerents and other Gulf States 
party to the Convention and its Protocol, their pledges to prevent, abate and 
combat pollution203 of the marine environment remained in force. To the extent 
that the agreements' terms restated customary norms,2°4 these too remained in 
force. 
Given the completion of the LOS Convention, its clauses paramount and its 
terms, virtually identical with those of the Kuwait Convention and its Protocol, 
together with terms of other treaties around the world that were virtually identical 
with the Convention and the Protocol by 1982, there was at least a developing 
customary norm, and perhaps a customary rule, alongside treaty principles stated 
in the Kuwait Convention and its Protocol, by 1982.205 If this is so, the belligerents 
were obliged not to act so as to pollute, or act to cause an imminent threat, to other 
Gulf States' interests, and to interests of other countries using Gulf waters for 
202 Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict 
freedom of navigation through actions such as attacks on the Nowruz and other 
terminal facilities206 when the result at the time of decision was likely to be a 
substantial spill.207 Under the Kuwait Convention, Iran was arguably within its 
rights to ask for an opportunity to stop the outflow.208 For the same reasons, there 
may have been violations of the Convention and the Protocol with respect to 
spillage resulting from Iraqi and Iranian attacks on shipping during the war,209 if 
such could have been foreseen to have resulted in substantial risk to other States' 
environmental interests, and such risks occurred. The record is less than clear on 
this point.2lO 
With respect to the 1990-91 conflict, the analysis is different. First, Iraq could 
claim suspension of the Convention and its Protocol under the law oftreaties.211 
Second, it could be argued that U.N. Security Council resolutions superseded the 
Convention and its Protocol because of the supremacy of Charter-based law in 
actions on the environment and in authorizing all necessary means to eject Iraq 
from Kuwait.212 To the extent that customary law was embodied in these treaties 
and such customary law survived in the face of Council action under the 
Charter,213 Iraq clearly violated these norms in its deliberate spillage of oil into 
the Gulf to foil a projected Coalition amphibious attack.214 
Since Coalition naval operations extended into the Red Sea as well as the Persian 
Gulf,2IS there was the potential of application of the Red Sea Convention and its 
Protocol as to treaty parties such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.216 If the two 
Conventions and Protocols, together with the 1982 LOS Convention, could be said 
to state customary norms that survived Council action under the Charter, there 
was a potential for violation by Coalition naval forces. The record is void as to both 
Red Sea and Gulf operations, and it is highly likely that there were no violations 
of customary norms by the Coalition in either theater. 
4. The Convention and the Law of the Maritime Environment 
This summary of Convention terms for protecting the marine environment 
demonstrates that Part XII and those terms included in other parts of the treaty 
are indeed prolix and comprehensive and there is little that is new law or 
unanticipated. Indeed, provisions related to the environment in many cases repeat 
principles seen in other contexts: the concept of "due regard" where there are two 
or more oceans uses at stake2I7; confirmation of the sovereign immunity of 
warships, naval auxiliaries and other government vessels on non-commercial 
service and State aircraft2I8; confirmation of application of the law of armed 
conflict in the context of environmental protection through application of other 
rules clauses, which do not include customary law of the environment as part of 
"other rules,,219; the same usage of "peaceful purposes" language in connection 
with the Area as on the high seas generally.220 Approval of the use of anticipatory 
self-defense against an environmental threat, previously stated in earlier treaties, 
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is some precedent for the concept of anticipatory self-defense in the context of the 
inherent right to self-defense mentioned in the Charter.221 
Other Persian Gulf States could possibly have asserted claims during the 
Tanker War if the belligerents' attacks on Gulf shipping caused slicks that 
threatened their interests, or if the attacks on the oil terminals, including that on 
Nowruz in 1983, raised the same threat.222 A similar analysis obtains for the 
Kuwait Convention and its Protocol.223 
Whether the deliberate flood by Iraq during the 1990-91 conflict could have 
been a predicate for similar claims depends on whether the law of the sea was 
superseded by the law of the Charter, and particularly the effect of U.N. Security 
Council decisions.224 A similar analysis would obtain under the regional 
conventions.225 Although there was the potential for applying the same law to 
Coalition operations, there is no indication that there were violations by Coalition 
naval forces.226 
Apparently these issues were not advanced in either war, but as the Convention 
is accepted by more States, either as treaty law or as customary norms, these claims 
may be raised in the future, particularly if the Convention is buttressed by similar 
terms in regional and bilateral agreements, although the Convention's norms 
trump any to the contrary in these treaties.227 
This cursory review of a complex body oflaw raises the double question of the 
relationship between the law of the maritime environment and the general law of 
the sea, perhaps under a "due regard" analysis, and the relationship between the 
law of the environment and the law of armed conflict, perhaps also on a "due 
regard" basis. This is complicated by the Convention's placement of some 
environmental norms within Part XII, the general standards, and its sprinkling 
others throughout the treaty.228 How do these bodies of law-the law of the 
maritime environment, the general law of the sea, and the law of armed 
conflict-interrelate? The Convention gives no clear answer on this issue. 
III. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
If the 1982 LOS Convention is a "constitution" for the law of the sea where the 
law of armed conflict is not involved, its provisions for protecting the marine 
environment could be said to be a seagoing "bill of rights" for the environment. 
Treaties varying from Convention environmental protection provisions are 
subject to the Convention's terms for those States that are party to it.229 Custom 
may compete with the Convention in the future, andjus cogens and U.N. Charter 
norms may supersede part of it as well.230 
Customary norms, first codified in the 1958 LOS Conventions, confirming 
sovereign immunity for warships, naval auxiliaries and other vessels on 
government non-commercial service and State aircraft, are affirmed in the 1982 
Convention and have been repeated in regional agreements.231 Similarly, 
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recognition of the law of armed conflict and its component, the law of naval 
warfare, as applicable in certain situations, is confirmed in the Convention's 
navigational articles and its environmental provisions.232 The principle of "due 
regard" for competing oceans uses, particularly on the high seas, has been carried 
forward into the 1982 Convention.233 
What is new is a complex, prolix protection for the maritime environment. The 
fundamental issue has become the relationship of this relatively new body of law 
with the general law of the sea and the law of armed conflict. 
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to the 1967 Torrey Canyon grounding. Healy, The C.M.I. and IMCO Draft Conventions on CivilLiabilityfor OiIPollution, 
1 J. Mar. L. & Com. 93 (1969). The Convention, supro, was modified by a Protocol of May 25, 1984, reprinted in 6 
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY (7th cd. rev., Wiswall cd. 1995), Doc. 6A and a Protocol of Nov. 27, 1992, reprinted in id., Doc. 
6B; neither arc in force for the United States. The Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of 
Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969,26 U.S.T. 765, 970 U.N.T.S. 212 [hereinafter 1969 Intervention Convention], 
also was a response to Torrey Canyon; it has been amended by the Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Steas 
in Cases of Marine Pollution by Substances Other than Oil, Nov. 2, 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 10561, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 
605 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Intervention Protocol]. The Intervention on the High Seas Act, 33 U.S.c. §§ 1471-78 
(1994) implements the Convention and its Protocol. See also 2 O'CoNNELL, supra n. 19, at 1006-07; SCHOENBAUM, 
ADMIRALTY AND MARmME LAW (2d ed.1994) S 16-1 at 825. 
23. In 1970, however, Richard A. Falk, told a Naval War College audience that the Torrey Canyon spill was the 
"Hiroshima" of the Ecological Age. See Falk, New Trends in International Law: The Challenges of the Ecological Age, 
Nav. War C. Rev. 18,21 (1970). 
24. Convention on Prohibition of Military or ADyOther Hostile Use ofEnvironmental Modification Techniques, 
May 18, 1977,31 U.S.T. 333; 1108 U.N.T.S. 152 [hereinafter ENMOD Convention]. 
206 Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict 
25. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions ofl2 August 1949, and Relating to Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Protocol Additional to Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and Relating to Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, id. 609. 
Although the United States is likely to ratify Additional Protocol II, the Reagan Administration had serious 
reservations concerning Additional Protocol I and did not seek U.S. Senate advice and consent for iL Letter of 
Transmittal from President Reagan to the U.S. Senate, Jan. 29, 1987; Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State 
Shultz to President Reagan, Dec. 13, 1986, in Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the 
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Noninternational Armed Conflicts, Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-2, looth Cong., 
1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 561 (1987). Many Additional Protocol I signatories ftled declarations or 
reservations. 
26. Convention for Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 
1949,6 U.S.T. 3114; 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for Amelioration of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, id. 3217; 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Convention 
Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,id. 3316; 75 U.N.T.S.135; Convention Relative to Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12; 1949, id. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Convention], 
provisions of which bear, directly or indirectly, on environmental issues during armed conflicL 
27. U.N. S.c. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M.846 (1991); U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution 47/37 (1992) also declared that existing international law prohibits environmental damage and depletion 
of narural resources, e.g. destruction of oil wells and releasing oil into the sea as occurred during the 1990.91 war. 
28. See generally BIRNIE & BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TIlE ENVIRONMENT (1994) at 128; Diederich, "Law of 
War" and Ecology - A Proposal for a Workable Approach to Protecting the Environment Through the Law of War, 136 Mil. 
L. Rev. 137, 160 (1992); Lijnzaad & Tanja, supra n. 2, at 189-200; Morris, Protection oftheEnvironmentin Wartime: The 
United Nations GeneralAssembly Considers the Needfora New CotrlJC1Ition, 27 Int'I Law. 775 (1993); Sharp, supra n. 2, at 
3; Plant, Elements of a "Fifth Geneva" Convention on the Protection of the Environment in Time of Armed Conflict, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra n. 2, at 37; Plant, G(1)emmen/ Proposals andFutureProspects, in id. 170; Plant,Legal 
Aspects, supra n. II, at 229-31; Plant,Responses to the London Conference and the Ottawa Conference of Experts on the Use 
of the Environment as a Tool ofCorroentional Warfare, 1()"12]uly 1991, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEcnON, supra at 161; 
Terry, The Environment and the Laws of War: The Impact of Desert Storm, 45 Nav. War C. Rev. 60, 65 (1992). 
29. U.N.G.A. Res. 47/37, supra n. 27; Morris, supra n. 28, at 780. 
30. GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS & NAVAL EXPERTS, SAN REMo MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO ARMED CoNFLICTS AT SEA (Doswald-Beck ed.1995) [hereinafter San Remo Manual], analyzed by 
Doswald-Beck, The San Rnno Manual on InternationalLawApplicable toArmed Conflicts at Sea, 89 A.J. I. L.192(1995), 
the ftrst compilation of the law of naval warfare since the London Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War, 
Feb. 26, 1909 [hereinafter London Declaration], reprinted in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A CoLLEcnON OF 
AGREEMENTS AND DocUMENTSWI11i CoMMENTARIES (Ronzitti ed. 1988) at 223 [hereinafter LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE], 
an unratifted multilateral treaty, and Instirut de Droit International, Oxford Manual ofNll1Xl1 War (1913) [hereafter 
Oxford Manual], reprinted in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra at 277. When World War I began, France and Russia 
tried to comply with the Declaration; Germany and Austria-Hungary adopted parts; the United Kingdom adopted 
it with additions and modifications, which were imitated by France, Italy and Russia. The Declaration became a 
propaganda issue and after further modifications was withdrawn in 1916. The United Kingdom explained that it was 
remming to the historic and admitted rules of the law of nations. 2 O'CoNNELL,SUpra n.19, at 1104; see also CoLOMBOS, 
supra n. 20, §§ 503-06. Today, the Declaration is considered to be a mixed bag of accepted rules, plus principles no 
longer relevant, in modern sea warfare. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CoNFLICT (2d ed. 1959) at 109; 
Kalshoven, Commentary, in LAWOF NAVAL W ARFARE,supra at 257, 273-74. Nor did the Oxford Manual achieve its goal 
of restating the rules. Verri, Commentary, in id. at 329, 340. Before and after these publications, naval powers have 
published compilations that have received acceptance by commentators, albeit with differing views on some points. 
See, e.g., U.S. Department of the Nauy, Commander's Handbook on the Law afNaval Operations, NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 
1-10 [hereafter NWP 9 (Rev. A)], analyzed in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Nav. War C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 64, 
Robertson ed. 1991). Sources such as the Declaration, the Oxford Manual, the San Remo Manual and NWP 9A, can 
strengthen the authority of custom or general principles and are secondary sources in anyevenL I.C.J. Statute, AIL 
38(1); REsTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWOFTItE UNITED STATES secs. 102-03 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement 
(Third)]; BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990) at 5. 
31. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958 [hereinafter Continental Shelf Convention], 15 U.S.T. 
471,499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on the High Seas [hereinafter High Seas Convention], Apr. 29,1958,13 id. 2312; 
450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on Fisheries and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958 
[hereinafter Fishery Convention], 17 id. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone, Apr. 29, 1958 [hereinafter Territorial Sea Convention], 15 id. 1606; 516 U.N.T.S. 205, [collectively cited 
hereinafter as the 1958 LOS Conventions]. The preamble of the High Seas Convention declares that it restates 
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customary international law, and is considered to restate customary law. Many, but not all, of the provisions of the 
other Conventions reflect customary international law. Annotated Supplement to NWP 9 (Rev. A),supra n. 30, para. 
1.1 at 1-2 n. 4; cf. 1 O'CoNNELL, TIlE INTERNATIONAL LAW OFTIlE SEA (Shearer ed. 1982) at 385, 474-76. 
32. E.g., Convention for Regulation of Whaling, SepL 13, 1931,49 StaL 3079; 155 L.N.T.S. 349, supplemented 
by Convention for Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 id. 1716; 161 U.N.T.S. 72, modified by Protocol, Nov. 19, 
1956, 10 U.S.T. 952; 338 U.N.T.S. 366. There are many amendments to the Protocol Schedule. See U. S. Department 
of State, TREATIEStN FORCE (1995) 443-44 [hereinafter TIF]. 
33. E.g., 1914 SaLAS, supra n. 21, applying only to passenger ships; Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea, July 15, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459; 1050 U.N.T.S. 16, [collectively hereinafter 1972 CoLREGs], reprinted in part as a 
CQIIlporile document in 6 BENEDICT,supra n. 22, Doc. 34; Convention for SafeJy of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974,32 U.S.T. 
47, amended by Protocol, Feb. 17, 1978,32 U.S.T. 5577 and as further amended; Proces·verbal of Rectification to 
SaLAS 1974, T.I.A.S. 10626, and other amendments [hereinafter 1974 SOLAS], reprinted and summarized in 6B & 6C 
BENEDICT,SUpra, Docs. 14-1, 14-2,14-6 -14-20. What began as a single treaJy in 1914 to regulate passenger liner safeJy, 
and thereby minimize losses by sinkings and therefore pollution of the sea from fuel (e.g. oil) and cargoes, has expanded 
into two sets of international agreements, SOLAS (dealing primarily with internal safeJy of vessels) and CoLREGS 
(establishing rules for safe navigation of vessels in relation to each other and thereby contributing to environmental 
protection through collision minimization), which contribute indirectly to a cleaner maritime environmenL Before 
becoming parIy to these agreements, many States had legislation governing rules of the road, e.g. Act to Adopt 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, ch. 802, 26 StaL 320, which collectively could be argued to be State 
custom on the poinL BROWNLIE, supra n. 30, at 5. Today, national legislation implements the agreements for many 
countries, including navigation of internal waters, although the 1972 CoLREGS, supra, rule 1(b), 28 U.S.T. at 3467, 
allows States to declare national rules for internal waters. The United States has special internal waters rules. See 
Inland Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2001-38 (1994); demarcation lines are published in 33 C.F.R. §§ 80.01-80.175 (1994). Of 
panicular interest to navies in reducing collision risks, and therefore the risk of pollution resulting from accidents, 
are incidents at sea agreements,e.g., Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, May 25, 1972, 
USSR-U.S., 23 U.S.T. 1168; 852 U.N.T.S. 151, and Protocol; May 22, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1063, supplemented by 
Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, June 12,1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 877 (1989); see also 1 
BROWN, TIlE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TIlE SEA (1994) at 285; Nagle, Note, The Dangerous Miliuny Activities Agreemenl: 
Minimum Order and Superpower Relalions on the World's Oceans, 31 Va. J. In!'1 L. 125 (1990). 
34. Hague Convention (VIII) Relative to Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, OCL 18, 1907, Am. 
1-6,36 StaL 2332, 234344; Hague Convention (IX) Concerning Bombarded by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct. 
18,1907, Am. 14, id. 2351,2363-64. 
35. Protocol for Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods ofWarfare,June 17, 1925,94 L.N.T.S. 65, with U.S. no·fIrSt·use reservation, Dec. 16, 1974, 26 U.S.T. 571-72. 
36. TreaJy on Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments, Apr. 15, 1935, Am. 
1-3,49 StaL 3267, 3268-70; 167 L.N.T.S. 289,290 [hereinafter Roerich Pact]. 
37. See, e.g., Founh Geneva Convention, supra n. 26, Am. 14-15,18-19,53,147 and 154, whose provisions along 
with Hague IX,supra n. 34, are protective of the environment when its provisions covering safe areas for the wounded, 
sick and aged, and children, expectant mothers and mothers of small children, hospital areas, convoys, and destrUction 
of propeny, coincidentally include environmentally sensitive areas. 
38. Convention for Protection of Cultural ProperIy in Event of Armed Conflict, and Protocol, May 14, 1954,249 
U.N.T.S. 21S, superseding and supplementing Hague IX, supra n. 34, and Roerich Pact, supra n. 36. 
39. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinled in 21 
I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 LOS Convention]. 
40. Guyana ratified the 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, on Nov. 16, 1993, and it is now in force for ratifying 
States. As of Feb. 23, 1995, 73 States had ratified the Convention. Status oflhe Convention andAgreemenl, 6 U.S. Dep't 
SL Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 53 (1995). The Clinton Administration sent the Convention to the Senate for advice and 
consent, together with a supplemental protocol, commonly known as the "Boat Agreement," which would amend 
pam of the deep seabed articles. The United States had declined to sign the Convention in 1982 because of 
objectionable terms in anicles dealing with deep seabed mining. See President of the United States, Message 
Transmilling United Nalions Convention on Ihe Law oflhe Sea, wilhAnnexes, Done al Mantego Bay, December 10, 1982 (Ihe 
"Convention'?, and Ihe Agreement Relaling to the Implementalion of Part XI oflhe United Nations Convenlion on the Law of 
the Sea of December 10,1982, with Annex, Adopled at New York,July 28,1994 (the "Agreement'?, and Signed by the United 
Siales, Subject 10Ratijication, onJuly 28,1994, S. TreaJy Doc. No. 103-39, 103d Cong.,2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter S.Doc. 
103-39], reprinled in part in 6 U.S. Dep't SL Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 1-52 (1995). Many countries have consented to 
be bound by the Boat Agreement, have signed it, or have agreed to apply it provisionally. The United States is in the 
last category. Slatus of the Agreement, supra. The United States has recognized the Convention's navigational 
anicles-the principal interface for the law of naval warfare and the law of the sea-as representing customary 
international law for over a decade. President Reagan, United Stales Ocean Policy, Mar. 10, 1983, 19 Weekly Comp. 
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Pres. Doc. 383 (Mar. 14, 1983). Commentators generally agree that these Convention provisions reflect customary 
international law. See, e.g., NWP 9 (Rev. A), supra n. 30,para.l.l; Restatement (Third),supra n. 30, Pan V,Introductory 
Note, at 3-5 (1987); if. Moore,Introduction to I NORDQUIST, UNITED NATIONS CoNVENTION ONTHE LAW OFTHE SEA 1982: 
A CoMMENTARY (1985) at xxviii; Oxman, International Law and N(l1Jal and Air Operations at Sea, in LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS, supra, n. 30, at 19, 29; but see 1 O'CoNNELL, supra n. 31, at 4849. O'Connell researched id. through 1978, 
using drafts of the evolving Convention, but died before the fmal version was available. Shearer made changes and 
additions, publishing before fmal negotiations produced the Convention. Shearer,Editor's Preface to id., at vii. Hence, 
O'Connell's volumes may reflect views of the decade before Restatement (Third), supra, was published. In 1983, the 
United States claimed a 200-mile exclusive economic zone(EEZ) in accordance with 1982 LOS Convention principles. 
Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (Mar. 10, 1983). In 1988, the United States claimed a 12-mile territorial 
sea in accordance with the Convention. Proclamation No. 5928, 54id. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988). Analysis of the Convention 
as modified by the Boat Agreement has been favorable. See Law of the Sea Forum: The 1994 Agreement on the Seabed 
Provisions of the Convention on the Law of theSe a, 88 A.J. I. L. 687 (1994). U.S. Department of Defense, National Security 
and the Convention on the Law of the Sea Guly 1994) urged advice and consent, stressing the Convention's imponance 
for national securiry. 
41.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, An. 311(1), specifically declaring that the Convention prevails, as among 
States pany to it, over the 1958 LOS Conventions, supra note 31. 
42. Annotated Supplement to NWP 9 (Rev. A), supra n. 30, Table STl-1; U.N. Pub. Sales No. E.83.V.5, supra n. 
39,at 190. 
43. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969 [hereinafter Vienna Conventions], An. 18, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 336; SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CoNVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2d cd. 1984) at 19,4244 (provisions 
may have gone beyond customary rules); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 312(3), cmt. i & r.n.6; U.N.G.A. Res. 
59a, 38 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 47, at 48 (1983) (calling on all States to refrain from actions undermining 1982 LOS 
Convention, supra n. 39). 
44. The United States and many commentators have said that the Convention's navigational articles restate 
customary law. See supra n. 40. 
45. Diederich,supra n. 28, at 4344, notes that the U.N. Chaner has no direct reference to environmental concerns 
but that this could be subsumed under W., Am. 1(3}( 4). 
46. U.N. Charter, ArL 103. This applies to U.N. Members' obligations under U.N. Securiry Council decisions 
pursuant to Am. 25,48. Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 A.J.I.L. 83,87 (1993). ArL 103's 
rule, analogous to the supremacy clause of U.S. ConsL, An. VI with respect to the laws of the 50 states of the United 
States, is at variance with traditional treary construction rules. Although later treaties on the same subject usually 
supersede earlier ones, the reverse-i.e., earlier treaties prevailing over later ones-is generally not true unless the 
later agreement declares it is subject to the earlier one. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra n. 43 Arts. 5, 30; see also 
Restatement (Third), supra, n. 30 sec. 323; SINCLAIR, supra, n. 43, at 85-87, 94-95, 160, 184-85,246. 
47. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39. An 237. ArL 237 is a lexspecialis for Pan XII of the Convention, i.e., its 
provisions for protecting the marine environmenL 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para 237.7(aXI99I); 1982 LOS 
Convention,supra,ArL 311(5) permits such. 5 NORDQUIST, UNITED NATIONS CoNVENTION ON THE LAW OFTHS SEA 1982: 
A CoMMENTARY para 311.11, (Rosenne & Sohn eds. 1989) at 243; see also Charney, The Marine Environment and the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 28 Int'I Law. 879,884 (1994). An. 237(1) states a recognized way to 
preserve the force of a prior treary, subject to the consistency limitation of ArL 237(2). Vienna Convention, supra n. 
43, ArL 30(2). 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW Gennings & Watts eds. 1992) sec. 590 at 1213 [hereinafter I 
OPPENHEill]; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 323(1); SINCLAIR, supra n. 43, at 97-98. 
48. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 29, An. 311(2). Presumably this includes 1972 CoLREGS and 1974 SOLAS, 
supra, n. 33. 
49. This might be contrasted with 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39,An 311(1), expressly superseding the 1958 
LOS Conventions,supra n. 31, where 1982 Convention parties are also panies to the 1958 agreements. If, in a particular 
situation, a country is pany to the 1958 Conventions but is not pany to the 1982 LOS Convention, and the other 
country is pany to the 1982 Convention and was parry to the 1958 Conventions, the 1958 rules apply. Vienna 
Convention,supra n. 43, An. 30(4Xb); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 323(3Xb); SINCLAIR,SUpra, n. 43 at 94. To 
the extent that custom, general principles or perhaps secondary sources such as court decisions or commentators 
would conflict with a treary norm in either the 1982 or the 1958 treaties at issues, those conflicting rules would be 
thrown into the decision matrix. If the customary rule, principle or other source is the same as the treary rule, the 
latter is strengthened. I.C.J. Statute, Am. 38, 59; Vienna Convention, supra, Preamble, Am. 38, 43 (recognizing the 
independent vitaliry of custom); BROWNUE,SUpra n. 30 at 12-19; D'AMATO, THE CoNCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1971) at 104-06, 114, 136, 164; VON GLAItN, LAW AMONG NATIONS (5th ed.1986) at 25 (recognizing principles as 
a gap-filler); 1 OPPENHEill, supra n. 47, sec. 11, at 33-36; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sees. 102-03 (recognizing 
principles as primarily a gap-filler); SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1991) at 49-65, 74-81 
(same); SINCLAIR, supra n. 43, at 6, 9-10,102-03; Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 Brit. Y.B. Int'l 
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L. 1,49·52 (1974); Robenson, Conumporory International Law: Relevant to Today's World?, 45 Nav. War C. Rev. 89, 
91·94 (Summer 1992). High Seas Convention, supra n. 31, has been generally recognized as stating customary rules. 
To the extent that these principles carry forward into the 1982 LOS Convention, they stand on quite f1rIll ground 
indeed. This is particularly important in the context of the relationship among the law of the sea, the law of armed 
conflict, and the emerging law of the environment as it applies to high seas operations. 
50.1982 LOS Convention supra n. 39, Arts. 192·237. 
51. See generally, e.g., id., Arts. 21(1)(f). 22(2), 23, 28(2), 33, 39(2)(b), 42(IXa)-42(I)(b), 42(2)42(5), 43{b), 44, 
56(I)(bXiii), 56(3), 60(1), 61-72, 80, 94(4Xc), 94(7), 116, 122·23, 145-46, 147(1), 147(2Xb), 147(c), 149, 233,303; for 
further analysis see 2 NORDQUIST, UNITED NATIONS CoNVENTIONONTHE LAWOFTHE SEA 1982: A CoMMENTARY, (Nandan, 
et al. eds. 1993) paras. 22.1-22.9, 23·1·23·9, 39.1·39.10(l), 42.1-41.1.10(l), 43.1-43.8(e), 44.1M.8(c), 61.1·61.12(k), 
62.1·62.16(1), 63.1·63.12(1), 64.1-64.(9XI), 65.1-65.16(i), 66.1·66.9(g), 67.1-67.8(e), 68.1-68.5(b), 69.1-69.17(h), 
70.1-70.11(d), 7l.1-71.9(c), 72.1-71.1O(b), 303.1-303.10; S. Doc. 103·39,6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch, Supp. No. I, at 23, 
25·28,51; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sees. 457, r.n. 7; 461, cmt. C; 512; 523(I)(bXii) & cmt.d. Some provisions 
of the Convention echo the 1958 LOS Conventions. See, e.g., Fishery Convention, supra n. 31, Arts. 1·8, 13; High Seas 
Convention, supra n.31, Arts. 10, 11(1), 13. 
52. The Stockholm Conference also "had a great influence for later deliberations on the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment" in later U.N. Committees and in the 1982 LOS Convention negotiations. 
Introduction, para. XII.ll, in 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, at 8·9; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, Part IV, Introductory 
Note, at 99; see also BIRNIE & BOYL!l,supra n. 28, at 39·53; Petsonik, The Role oJthe United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) in The Development oJInternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 5 Am. U.J. Int'I L. & Pol. 351 (1990). The Conference 
Report included a Declaration on the Human Environment [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration] with 26 Principles, 
an Action Plan for the Human Environment, and various resolutions. See 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). Principle 6 states in 
part that "[D]ischarge of toxic ••• or other substances and the release of heat in such quantities or concentrations as 
to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harmless, must be halted ••• to ensure that serious or 
irreversible damage is not inflicted on ecosyustems." Principle 7 declares that "States shall take all possible steps to 
prevent pollution of the seas by substances .•• liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and 
marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea ..•• " Principle 21 says States must 
achieve a balance between exploiting their resources and their responsibility to see that this does not harm others' 
environments: 
States have, in accordance with the [U.N. Charter] and the principles ofinternationallaw, the sovereign right 
to exploit their own resoutces pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or 
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Principle 22 would require "States [to] co·operate to develop further the international law regarding liability and 
compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction 
or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction ..•• " Principle 26 protested nuclear weapons, and other 
weapons of mass destruction, with a plea for agreements to eliminate and destroy them. Id, at 1418, 1420·21. U.N. 
Environmental Programme Participation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93·188, sec. 2, 87, Stat. 713, declared U.S. 
Congressional policy "to participate in coordinating efforts to solve environmental problems of global and 
international concern .••• " Two years later, U.N.G.A. Res. 3281, CharteroJEconomicRights and Duties oJStates, at Arts. 
29·30, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975), reiterated nations' duties to use the sea for peaceful purposes to preserve the 
environment. These resolutions, except insofar as they restated customary or conventional law, were not binding on 
U.N. Members. U.N. Charter, Arts. 10, 14. See infra n. 62 and accompanying text. 
53. Kuwait Regional Convention for Co·operation on Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, 
Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133 [hereinafter Kuwait Regional Convention]; Protocol concerning Co·operation in 
Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Case of Emergency, Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 201 
[hereinafter Kuwait Protocol]. All countries bordering the Persian Gulf were signatories: Baharain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. The Convention and Protocol went into force July 1, 1979. Salter, supra n. 2, at 
351. Kuwait Regional Convention. Protocol on Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the 
Continental Shelf, Mar. 29, 1989, has been signed. 1 BROWN, supra n. 33, at 355·56. 
54. Convention for Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, Feb 14, 1982, reprinted in 2 
WALLACE, supra n. 20, at 2282 [hereinafter Red Sea Convention]; Protocol Concerning Regional Co·operation in 
Combating Pollution by Oil and Other Harmful substances in Cases of Emergency, Feb 14,1982 [hereinafter Red Sea 
Protocoll, reprinted in id. at 2293. Signatories inc1udeJordan, Palestine Liberation Organization for Palestine, People's 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen Arab Republic, all bordering the Red Sea 
and Gulf of Aden, but any Arab League member can accede to the Convention. Red Sea Convention, supra, Preamble, 
Art. 26(2), id, at 2282, 2291. 
55. See generally, DOD REPORT, supra n. 2, at 48·63,88·181,221. 
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56. E.g., Kuwait Regional Convention, supra n. 53, Arts. 16-18; Kuwait Protocol, supra n. 53, Arts. 3, 5-13; Red 
Sea Convention,supra n. 54, Arts. 16-20,22,24; Red Sea Protocol,supra n. 54, Arts. 3, 5-13. Another recent example, 
involving U.S. participation, is a package of agreements governing protection of the South Pacific Ocean. Convention 
for Protection of Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, Nov. 24, 1986,reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 
38(1986); Protocol for Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by Dumping, Nov. 24, 1986, reprinted in id, 
65 (1986); Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution Emergencies in the South Pacific Region, Nov. 
24,1986, reprinted in id, 59 (1986); see also U.S. Understanding, S. Treaty Doc. 101-21, at 53. 
57. See, e.g., 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39,Arts. 23, 39, 41(5), 43(a), 94(4Xc), 94(5), 197,200-02,207-12,217, 
221-22,303; see also 5 NORDQtDST supra n. 47, paras. 311.8m 311.11. 
58. Vienna Convention, supra n. 43, Preamble, Arts. 38,43. 
59. See generally lC.J. Statute, Arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, §§ 102"()3. 
60. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case], 
1986I.C.J. 14,31-38,91-135; CoifU Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.e.J. 4, 22. 
61.Akehurst, supra n. 49, at 49-52. The 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 22(1), seems to anticipate this 
possibility with respect to proportionate anticipatory action to ward off pollution threats. Art. 310 states: 
Article 309 does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from 
making declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inter alia, to the 
harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided that 
such declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the 
provisions of this Convention in their application to the State. 
ArL 309 forbids reservations or exceptions to the Convention and is the reason for the Boat Agreement, supra n. 40, 
to amend Part XI of the Convention. See supra n.4O and accompanying texL Such statements, taken collectively, 
arguably could articulate custom apan from the Convention. However, occasional presence of clear, contradictory 
authorizations for custom, e.g., Art 22(1), plus the "obscurity and uncertainty" of Art. 310's meaning-;:f. 5 NORDQtDST, 
supra n. 47, para 310.5-indicate that custom and other sources can be considered alongside Convention norms. 
Certainly this is true for the law of naval warfare, largely customary in source, which enters through the "other rules" 
clauses, with which the Convention is replete. 
62. U.N. Members must comply with Security Council "decisions" under U.N. Charter, Arts, 25,41,48; these 
supersede treaty obligations. !d., Art. 103; Reisman, Constitutional Crisis, supra n. 46 at 87. The Council may also 
recommend action or call upon States for action pursuant to U.N. Charter, Arts. 39-41, or the General Assembly may 
recommend action under id., Arts. 10, 14, but these resolutions do not have the binding force of decisions, although 
they may restate customary or treaty norms and thereby strengthen them. BAILEY, THE PROCEDURE OF TIlE U.N. 
SECURiTY CoUNCIL (2d ed.1988) ch. 3.6; BROWNLIE, supra n. 30, at 5, 699-700; CASTENADA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED 
NATIONS REsOLUTIONS (Amoia trans. 1969) at ch.3.j; GoODRICH et al., CHARTER OF TIlE UNITED NATIONS (3d rev. ed. 
1969) 111-14, 141-45,207-11,290-314,334-37,614-17; Restatement (Third), supra, n. 30, sccs. 102, cmL g; 103(2Xd), 
cmt. c & r.n.2; SCHACHTER, supra n. 49, ch. 6; SIMMA, THE CHARTEROFTIIE UNITED NATIONS: A CoMMENTARY (1994), 
at 236-42, 270-87, 409-18, 614-16, 618, 626-28, 631-35, 651, 1118-25. 
63.Jus cogem is a fundamental norm that would override rules in treaties and custom, two primary sources of 
international law stated in, e.g., I.C.J. Statute, Arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Second), supra n. 30,secs. 102-03. Its contours 
are vague and depend on a commentator's views, which can range from expansive (e.g., those of the former U.S.S.R., 
whose jurisprudence may still have influence) to totally deprecatory. See generally Vienna Convention,supra n. 43, at 
53,64, considered by SINCLAIR, supra n.43, at 17-18,218·26, to be progressive development; ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW 
OF TREATIES, (1974) at 177-87; I OPPENHEIM, supra n. 47, sccs. 2, at 8 & n. 2; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30 sec. 
338(e); TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Butler trans. 1974) at 98; Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in 
Contemporary International Law, 172 R.C.A.D.l 219, 262·63 (1981); Hazard, Soviet Tactics in InternationalLaw Making, 
7 Den. J. Int'I L. & Pol. 9, 25 (1977); Arechaga, International Law in the Past 17zird of a Century, 159 RC.A.Dol. 1,68 
(1978); Weisburd, 17ze Emptiness of the Cancept of Jus Cogens. As Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 Mich. 
J. Int'I L. 1 (1995). The I.C.J. held in the Nicaragua Case, supra n. 60, that U.N. Charter, Art. 2(4), was customary law 
having the character of jus cogem. The 1979 U.S.S.R invasion of Afghanistan, pursuant to a 1978 agreement, was 
condemned in part under Vienna Convention, supra, Art. 53 principles. States-International Status, Attrihutes & 
Types, 1979 Digest sec. I, at 34, quoting Memorandum from Owen, U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser, to 
Christopher, Acting Secretary of State, Dec. 29, 1979. A more interesting issue, left unanswered by the Charter, is the 
place of customary law or general principles varying from the Charter's terms as a treaty. This was not resolved in the 
Nicaragua Case, supra. The Charter, Art. 103, speaks of "obligations" under treaties, and whether this includes custom 
and perhaps principles, is debatable. SIMMA, supra n. 62, at 1118-25, would argue for Charter supremacy. Perhaps 1 
OPPENHEIM,supra, would agree if the Charter norm isjus cogem in nature. One competing factor is the force ofnational 
sovereignty; if U.N. Members gave up freedom to make treaties to the measure of U.N. Charter, ArL 103, that does 
not necessarily mean that they gave up the sovereign right to build contrary custom, under this theory. See e.g., U.N. 
Charter, Arts. 2(1), 2(7); 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, AIL 157(3); Vienna Convention, supra n.43, Preamble; 
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U.N. Secretary·General,AnAgendafor Peace: Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. Doc. 
A/47/277 S/2411 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 956, 959 (1992); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser.A) 4, 18 
[hereinafter LDtus Case]; S.S. Wimbledon CD.K. v. Ger.), 1923 id., No.1, at 15, 25; Declaration of Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States, U.N.G.A. Res. 2625, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292; 
BROWNLlE,mpra n. 30, ch. 13; Anand,SO'Dereign EqualityofStates in International Law, 197 C.A.D.!. 9, 22-51, 189 (1986); 
Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Consideredfrom the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 id, 49-50 
(1957); Lachs, The Development and General Trends of International Law in OurTtime, 169 id, 1,77-84 (1980); Waldock, 
General Coune on Public International Law, 106 id, 1, 156-72 (1962). 
64. Compare e.g., 1982 LOS Convention, mpra n. 39, Preamble, Arts. 2(3) (territorial sea), 19,21,31 (innocent 
passage), 342(2) (straits transit passage), 45 (straits innocent passage, incorporation by reference of Arts. 19,21,31), 
52(1) (archipelagic sea lanes passage), 58(1), 58 (3) (EEZs), 78(2) (continental shelf; coastal State cannot infringe or 
interfere with "navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided in this Convention), 87(1) (high 
seas), 138 (the Area), 303(4) (archaeological, historical objects found at sea; "other international agreements and rules 
of international law regarding the protection of objects of an archaeological and historical nature"), with e.g., High 
Seas Convention, mpra n. 31, Art. 2, Territorial Sea Convention, mpra n. 31, An.!. Although the other 1958 LOS 
Conventions do not include specific "other rules" clauses, they state that they do not affect the status of waters above 
as high seas, in the case of the continental shelf, or other high seas rights, in the case of high seas fisheries. Continental 
ShelfConvention,mpra n. 31, Arts. 1,3,15; Fishery Convention,mpra n. 31, Arts. 1-8,13. 
65.1982 LOS Convention,mpra n. 39,Art. 87(1). 
66.The General Assembly elects 34 members to the I.L.C. after nominations by governments. The 1958 LOS 
Conventions, mpra n. 31, emerged through the I.L.C. See generally, BRIGGS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW CoMMISSION 
(1969); BROWNLIE, mpra n. 30 at 30-31; SCHACHTER, mpra n. 49, at 66-69, 71-72; Briggs, Reflections on the CodijiClllion 
of International Law by the International Law Commission and by Other Agencies, 126 R.C.A.D.I. 233 (1969); Jennings, 
The Progressive Development of International Law and Its Codification, 24 Brit. Y.B. In!,1 L. 301, 310-29 (1947); 
Lauterpacht, CodifICation and Development of International Law, 49 A.J.I.L. 16 (1955); Rosenne, The International Law 
Commission, 1949-59, 30 Brit. Y.B. In!'1 L. 104 (1960). 
67. International Law Commission, Commentary on Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in Reponofthe 
Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966) reprinted in 1962(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 
267-68; Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the International COUT/ofJustice, 68 A.J.I.L. 
51 (1974); Boczek,PeacejulPurposes Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 20 Ocean Devel. 
& Int'l L. 359 (1989); Christol & Davis, Cuban Quarantine: The NtrDal Interdiction of Offensive Weapons andAssociated 
Material to Cuba, 1961, 57 A.J.I.L. 525, 53940 (1963); Davidson, United States Protection of Rejlagged Kuwaiti Vessels 
in the Gulf War: The LegalImplications, 4 Int'l J. Estuarine & Coastal L. 173, 178 (1989); Fenrick, Legal Aspects of the 
Falklands NtrDal Conflict, 24 Mil. L. & L. of War Rev. 243, 245 (1983); Lowe, The Commander's Handbook on the Law 
ofNtrDal Operations and the Contemporary Law of the Sea in LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONs,mpra n. 30,at 109, 132; Oxman, 
The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Corrventions on the Law of the Sea, 24 Va. J. In!'l L. 809, 811 (1984); 
Ronziui, The Crisis of the Traditional Law Reguiating InternationalArmed Conflicts at Sea and the Needfor Its Revision in 
LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, mpra n. 30, at 15; Russo, Neutrality at Sea, mpra n. 9, at 384; Thorpe, Mine Waifare at 
Sea - Some Legal Aspects of the Future, 18 id, 255, 257 (1987); Wolfrum, Rejlagging and Escort Operations in the Persian 
Gulfi An InternationalLaw Perspective, 29 Va.J. In!'1 L. 386, 391-92 (1982). Apparent dissenters include 2 O'CoNNELL, 
mpra n.19,at 1112-13,referrlngtoid, 747-69, in the context of the nationalityofmerchant ships; Low & Hodgkinson, 
mpra n. 2, at 421, who discuss Iraq's environmental protection obligations in the LOS context and say nothing about 
the clauses, although id 438-42 elliptically seems to recognize the principle; Okorodudu-Fubara,mpra n. 2, at 195-97; 
Rauch, The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of VICtims of International Armed Conflicts and 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Repercussions on the Law ofNtrDal Waifare: Report to the Committee 
on the Protection of Human Life in Armed Conflict of the Society for Military Law of War 22-49a Guly 1983) (manuscript 
in author's possession). 1 BROWN, mpra n. 33, at 280 recognizes the similar "other rules" clauses pertaining to high 
seas rights but declares that "freedom of the high seas must be exercised under conditions laid down in the Convention 
and by other unspecified rules ofinternationallaw." 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONONTIiE LAWOFTIiE SEA 1982: A 
CoMMENTARY, (Nordquist ed. 1995) [hereinafter 3 NORDQUIST] at para. 87.9(i) states that "Uses of the high seas for 
military purposes-though restricted in other maritime zones, comes within the scope of the freedom of the high 
seas," citing to 1982 LOS Convention, mpra n. 39, Arts. 19(2)(b), 19(2Xf), 52(2), (innocent passage). Similar clauses 
in High Seas Convention,mpra n. 31, Art. 2, had been interpreted to include freedom to undenake scientific research, 
to explore or exploit high seas subsoil resources and to test nuclear weapons. These are now regulated by 1982 LOS 
Convention,mpra, Parts XI & XIII; Treaty on Prohibition of Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons 
of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971,23 U.S.T. 704; 
955 U.N.T.S. 115 [hereinafter Seabed Treaty]. 
68. 1982 LOS Convention, mpra n. 39, Art. 88. The Convention also says that Area use is reserved for peaceful 
purposes, and marine scientific research must be conducted for peaceful purposes. Id., Arts. 141, 143(1), 147(2Xd), 
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155, 240(a), 242(1), 246(3). Ensuing analysis will be confined to Art. 88; conclusions with respect to it apply mutatis 
mutandis to other "peaceful purposes" provisions. The language originated in Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, Art. 1(1), 
12 U.S.T. 794, 795; 402 U.N.T.S. 71, 72 and is in Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, Art. 4, 18 id. 2410, 2413-14; 
610 U.N.T.S. 205, 207 [hereinafter Space Treaty]; ENMOD Convention, supra n. 24, Art. 3(1), 31 id. at 336; 1108 
U.N.T.S. at 153; Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dee. 5, 1979, 
Art. 3(1), 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, 22. 
69. Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, § 521, cmL b, citing U.N. Charter, Art. 2(4); 1982 LOS Convention,supra 
n. 39, Arts. 88 & 301, and referring to Restatement (Third), supra, § 905, cmt. gj accord, Russo, Targeting Theory in the 
Law of Naval Waifare, 30 Nav. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1992); see also 2 NORDQUlST,supra, n. 67, paras. 87.9(i), 88.1-88-7(d). Boczek, 
supra n. 67; Oxman, Regime of Warships, supra n. 67, at 814, 829-32j Parkerson, International Legal Implications of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, 116 Mil. L. Rev. 67, 79-85 (1987). 
70. U.N. Charter, Art. 103j see also supra n. 46 and accompanying texL 
71. See supra nn. 46-49 and accompanying texL 
72. U.N. Charter, Art. 51; see also S. Doc. 103-39, 6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch, Supp. No.1, at 51. There is a debate 
as to whether anticipatoty self-defense, as opposed to "reactive" self-defense where an aggressor must strike the first 
blow before a right of self-defense is triggered, is permitted in the Charter era. The U.S. view, supported by many 
researchers, is that anticipatotyself-defense is permissible in the Charter era under Caroline Case limitations, i.e. when 
there is a clear necessity that is instant, overwhelming and leaves no choice of peaceful means,see NWP 9A, supra n. 
30, para. 4.3.2.1, citing Caroline Case, letter of U.S. Secretaty of State Daniel Webster to U.K. Ambassador Lord 
Alexander B. WashbUrton, Aug. 6, 1842,2 MooRE, DIGEST411-l2j letterofSecretaty Websterto U.K. Minister Henty 
S. Fox, Apr. 24, 1841, in 1 SHEWMAKER, THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS (1983) at 58, 67. Some 
scholars take the opposite view. See generally BoWEIT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958) at 187-93 ; 
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TIlE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963) at 257-61, 275-78, 366-67; DINSTEIN, WAR, 
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE (1988) at 86,174-79; HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES (1995) at 
121-25; MCDOUGAL & FEUCthNO, LAw AND MINLIIUM WORLD PUBUC ORDER (1961) at 232-41; MCNhlR & WATTS, TilE 
LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR (4th ed. 1966) at 16, 18 ; O'CONNELL, TilE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER (1979) at 83; 1 
OPPENHELII, supra n. 47, sec. 127; SCilAClITER, supra n. 49, at ISO-52; SI1IMA, supra n. 54, at 675-76; STONE, AGGRESSION 
AND WORLD ORDER (1958) at 44; Bunn, InternationalLaw and the Use ofForcein Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to Take 
the First Hit?, 39 Nav. War C. Rev. 69-70 (1986); Greenwood,Remarks, in Panel, Neutrality, The Rights of Shipping and 
the Use afForce in the Persian Gulf War (Part 1), 1988 Proe. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 158, 159-61 (1990); Lagoni, Remarks, in 
id. 161, 162; Linnan, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security: United States and Other Views, 1991 Duke J. 
Compo & Inri L. 57, 65-84,122; Lowe, supra n. 67,at 127-30; McHugh, ForcibleSelf-Help in IntemationalLaw, 25 Nav. 
War C. Rev. 61 (No.2, 1972); Reisman, Criteriaforthe Use afForce in International Law, 10 Yale J. Int'l L. 279 (1985); 
Turner, State Sovereignty, International Law, and the Use of Force in Countering Low-Intensity Aggression in the Modern 
World, in LEGAL AND MORAL CoNSTRMNTSON Low-INTENSITY CoNFUCT (Nav. War C. Inri L. Stud., v. 67, Coli, et al. 
eds.1995)at 43,62-80; Waldock, TheRegulation of the UseofForceby IndividualStatesinInternationalLaw, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 
451,496-99 (1952). Lowe, supra n. 67 at 128, notes that the Nicaragua Case, supra n. 60, at 93, specifically excluded 
considering anticipatoty self-defense, and that States will likely rely on it more in the future. 
73. See supra nn. 31-33 and accompanying texL 
74. E.g., Civil Liability Convention, supra n. 22, Art. 3(1), (exclusion ofliability due to "act of war, hostilities, 
civil war, [or] insurrection"). The Convention has been modified by 1976 Protocol,supra n. 22, and would be further 
modified by 1984 Protocol, Art. 3, reprinted in 6 Benedict, supra n. 22, Doc. 6A, which extended coverage to parties' 
declared EEZs, or to a 200-mile belt off coasts of States that have not declared one. The 1992 Protocol,supra n. 22,id., 
Doc. 6B, modifies the Convention in ways irrelevantto this analysis. See generally 2 O'CoNNELL, supra n.19, at 1008-10. 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7,1944, Art. 89, 61 StaL 1180, 1205; 15 U.N.T.S. 295,356, declares 
that it applies during war. 
75. E.g., Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954 [hereinafter 1954 Oil Pollution 
Convention], Art. 19, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 3004; 327U.N.T.S. 3, 18; amendments, Apr. 11, 1962, 17 id. 1523; 600 U.N.T.S. 
332, and OeL 21,1969,28 id. 1205, do not affect this Article; Treaty for Establishment of the European Economic 
Community, Mar. 15, 1957, Arts. 223-26, 1973 Gr. BriL T.S. No.1- Part II (Cmd. 5179-11),298 U.N.T.S. 3, 88-89. 
76. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, Art. 2204, T.I.A.S. No. --,reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 
289,605,702 (1993) [hereinafter NAFT A). NAFTA has many environmental protection provisions. NAFT A, supra, 
Arts. 104, 709-24, 901-15, 1101, 1114, 2005, 2014-15, 2101, analyzed in MhGRAW, NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS (1995) ch.l; Baker,Ajier the NAFTA, 27 Int'l Law. 765, 769 (1993); Garvey, Trade Law and 
QualityofLife-DisputeResolution UndertheNAFTA SideAccords on LaborandtheEnvironment, 89 A.J.I.L. 439 (1995); 
Ludwiszewski, "Green" Language in the NAFTA; Reconciling Free Trade and EnvironmentalProteaion, 27 Inri Law. 691 
(1993); Stewart, The NAFTA: Trade, Competition, Environmental Protection, id. 751 (1993). NAFTA includes a specific 
national security exception, stating inter alia that nothing in it shall be construed to prevent a party from taking actions 
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it considers necessary to protect its "essential security interests," taken during war or other emergency in international 
relations, or to prevent a party from acting pursuant to its obligations under the U.N. Charter for maintaining 
international peace and security. NAFTA, supra, Arts. 2102(1)(b}2102(c). A potentially hemispheric agreement, 
NAFTA is subject to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61(5,6) Stat., 55-61 U.N.T.S. 
[hereinafter GA TIl; TIF, supra n. 32, at 355-58, lists GATT amendments. NAFTA, supra, Art.l03(1). GATT, supra, 
Art. 21,61(5), is similar to NAFTA,supra, Art. 2102. 
77. E.g., Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol, supra n. 53; Red Sea Convention and Protocol, supra n. 54. 
78. See supra n. 31 and accompanying text. 
79. Cf. I.e.J. Statute, Arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sccs. 102-03; see also supra nn. 49,58-61 and 
accompanying text. 
80. Vienna Convention, supra n. 43, Art. 61; see also ELIAS, supra n. 63, at 128-30; Restat~ment (Third), supra n. 
30, § 336, cmt. c & r.n. 3; SmcLAlR,supra n. 43, at 190-92; International Law Commission, Report on the Work ofits 
Eighteenth Session, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. N6309/Rev. 1 [hereinafter LL.C. 
Report), reprinted in 2(1974) Y.B. In!'l L. Comm'n 171,255-56 (noting relative rarity of the practice). MCNhIR, THE 
LAW OF TREhTlES (2d ed. 1961) at 685 does not recognize a separate doctrine, butsome of his hypothetical examples 
arc impossibility situations. 
81. Vienna Convention, supra n. 43, Art. 62, said declaratory of customary law by Fisheries Jurisdiction CO.K. 
v.lce.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18; see also I.L.e. Report, supra n. 80, at 257-58; Restatement (Third),supra n. 30,sec. 336 & r.n. 
1; SINCLAlR,supra n. 43, at 20, 192-96; Sharp,supra n. 2, at 24-25. For criticism of the Convention approach, substituting 
a new tertn -fundamental change of circumstances - for the traditional rebus sic stantibus phrase in revising the 
rules, see DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREhTY TERMINATION (1975) ch. 1; Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 
61 A.J.I.L. 895 (1967). ELIAS,supra n. 63, at 119-28, says the traditional view of rebus sic stantibus is no longer admissible 
today. For further analysis of pre -Convention practicc,see Bedertnan, The 1871 Declaration. Rebus Sic Stantibus and a 
Primitivist View of the Law of Nations, 81 A.J .I.L. 1 (1988); Haraszti, Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 
146 RC.A.D.I. 1 (1975). U.S. practice has recognized the principle in what today would be considered a maritime 
environmental context. See Lissitzyn, supra, at 908-11. 
82. Vienna Convention, supra n. 43, takes no position on the impact of artned conflict on treaties. Attempts to 
insert a Convention provision were defeated. Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 A.J.I.L. 495, 557 (1970). 
Other sources must be examined for applicable law in such situations. Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation, supra n. 67, at 
51. Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 336 cmt. e & r.n. 4, says war may be a basis for a fundamental change of 
circumstances claim. Others have considered war as a separate ground. See, e.g., Institut de Droit International, The 
Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, Aug. 28, 1985, 61(2) Annuaire 278 (1986); Institut de Droit International, 
Regulations Regarding the Effect of War on Treaties, 1912, 7 A.J.I.L. 153 (1913); Clark 'D. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); 
Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231 (1929); Techl'D. Hughes, 128 N.E. 185, 191 (N.Y.), ccrt. denied, 254 U.S. 643 
(1920); 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW sec. 99(4}(5) (Lauterpacht, ed., 7th ed. 1952); Davis, The Effects of War 
Upon International Conventions and Private Contracts, 1927 Proc. Am. Soc'y In!,1 L. 124-29; Fitzmaurice, TheJudicial 
Clauser of the Peace Treaties, 73 Re.A.D.I. 255, 307-17 (1948); Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 
35(b), 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. 657, 664-65 (1935); Hurst, The Effea of War on Treaties,2 Brit. Y.B. In!'1 L. 37 (1921); Lenoir, 
The Effect of War on Bilateral Treaties, with Special Reference ta Reciprocal Inheritance Treaty Provisions, 34 Geo. L.J. 129 
(1946); Sharp, supra n. 2, at 23-24. 
83. Institut de Droit International, supra n. 82, Arts. 3-4,61(2) Annuaire at 280; id., Regulations Regarding the 
Effect of War on Treaties, Art. 5, 7 A.J.I.L. 154; 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST (1943) sec. 513, at 383-84; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra 
n. 82,sec. 99(2), 99(5); Fitzmaurice,Judicial Clauses,supra n. 82, at 312; Harvard Draft Convention,supra n. 82, Art. 
35(a), 29 A.J.I.L. Supp. at 664; Hurst, supra n. 82, at 42. 
84.U.N. Charter,Art. 2(2); Vienna Convention,supra n. 43,Art. 26; BROWNLIE, supra n. 30, at 616; I.L.C. Report, 
supra note 80, at 211; KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Knight trans. 1967) at 216; MCNAIR, supra n. 80, at 493-505; 
Restatement (Third),supra n. 30,sec. 321; Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles" in the Development of International 
Law, 57 A.J.I.L. 279, 286-87 (1963); Harvard Draft Convention,supra n. 82,Art. 20, 29id., Supp. at 661; Hassan, Good 
Faith ill Treaty Formation, 21 Va. J. In!'l L. 443, 480-81 (1981); Nicaragua Case, supra n. 63, 1986 I.C.J. at 135-42. ELIAS, 
supra n. 63, at 43-44,says thatpactasuntservanda cannot beajus cogens principle, as KELSEN,supra, would argue, because 
it is subject to exceptions, e.g., fundamental change of circumstances. 
85. Vienna Convention, supra n. 43, Art. 18; see also supra n. 43 and accompanying text. 
86. See generally Symposium, State Succession in the Former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, 33 Va. J. Int'l L. 
253 (1993); Walker, Integration and Disintegration in Europe: Reordering the Treaty Map of the Continent, 6 Transnat'l 
Law. 1 (1993). 
87. For an example, see supra nn. 31 & 40 and accompanying text. 
88. I.C.J. Statute, Arts. 38, 59; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, seer. 102-03; see also supra nn. 49 & 60 and 
accompanying text. 
214 Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict 
89. "In at least one respect [its terms] are more restrictive than customary international law, namely in the case 
of the territorial sea." 2 O'CoNNELL, supra n. 19, at 994; Charney,Marine Environment, supra n. 47, at 887. 
90. S. Doc.103-39,supra n. 4O,reprinred in 6 U.S. Dep't SL Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 19. 
91. E.g., 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Am. 1(IX4)-1(IX5), 21, 23, 39, 41, 43, 54, 56(I)(bXiii), 60(3), 63, 
66-67,94(7), 116, 123(b), 14547, 155(2), 162, 165. 
92. !d., Art. 192; compare Stockholm Declaration, supra n. 52, Principle 7; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, at 
3643. The U.S. Department of Defense and the Navy view AIL 236 of the Convention and Part XII "as a mandate to 
ensure responsibility for environmentally sound practices." Schachte, The Value of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea: Preserving Our Freedoms and Protecting the Environment, 23 Ocean Deve!. & Int'l L. 55, 61 (1992). 
93. See generally 2 NORDQUlST,SUpra n. 51,para.1.23, arguing for an evolving conceptual definition; 4 NORDQUIST, 
supra n. 20, para. 192.11(a); Tolbert, Defining the Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra, n. 2 at 259. 
94. S. Doc. 103·29, supra n. 4O,reprinredin 6 U.S. Dep't SL Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 19. 
95. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 1(IX4); see also 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 50, paras. l.l-1.15, 1.22-1.24, 
1.26-1.31; The LOS definition means that the environment is both human and nature centered. See Tolbert, supra n. 
93, at 259. 
96. 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 193; compare Stockholm Declaration, supra n. 52, Principle 12, 11 id. 
at 1419; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, at 4549. Vallatta, Protection and Preservation o/the Marine Environment and 
Marine Scientific Research at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in Symposium, The Law of the 
Sea: Where Now, 46 L. & Contemp. Probs. 146, 149 (1983) said the duty to preserve and protect the environment is a 
jus cogens norm. 
97. "Significant" is not stated as part of the duty in this part of the Convention, but other Convention provisions, 
regional agreements, and commentators have added terms like "major," "serious," "significant" or "substantia!." See, 
e.g., 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 94(7), 233; Kuwait Protocol, supra n. 53, Art. 1(2); Red Sea Protocol, 
supra n. 54, AIL 1(2); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, secs. 601(I)(b}601(3), 603(IXa), 603(2); Low & Hodgkinson, 
supra n. 2, at 422-23. Such sources, when combined, can evidence custom. BROWNLIE, supra n. 30, at 5. 
98. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 194(1); see also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 603(2). The 
"prevention" theme was partly derived from High Seas Convention, supra n. 31, Am. 24-25, and limitation to 
"capabilities" from Stockholm Declaration,supra n. 52, Principle 7; 4 NORDQUlST,SUpra n. 20, paras. 194.1, 194.1O(b). 
Diligent prevention and control are probably binding norms. Cf, BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra n. 28, at 95. 
99. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, AIL 194(2); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, §§ 601(IXb), 601(2), 
603(IXa),603(2). 
100. 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para. 194.1O( e). 
101. Dumping is defined in 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, AIL 1(IX5); see also 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, 
paras. 1.l-1.l5, 1.24, 1.26-1.31. 
102.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39,Art.194(3); compare Protocol ofl978 Relating to International Convention 
for Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973,Feb.17, 1978, T.I.A.S. No.-, 134OU.N.T.S. 61,incorparatingbyreference 
and amending Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184 [hereinafter 
collectively MARPOL 73n8], Art. 2(2), Annex II, 1340 U.N.T.S. at 184,233, defining "harmful substance," not 
explained in the 1982 Convention. 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para. 194.1O(j). Art. 194(3) is broader in sweep than 
MARPOL 73n8. The language in id., AIL 2(2), defining pollution, is the same as 1982 LOS Convention, supra, ArL 
1(IX 4). MARPOL 73n8 parties represent 92 percent of the Earth's merchant tonnage. BOWMAN & HARRIS, 
MULTILATERAL TREATIES (11th Cum. Supp. 1995) at 295. It is a fair assumption that its terms represent customary 
law; therefore, similar terms used in similar circumstances in the 1982 LOS Convention also restate custom. BROWNLIE, 
supra n. 30, at 5. The injury must be significant, however. See supra n. 97 and accompanying texL 
103. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, ArL 194(4). This restates a customary norm. 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, 
para. 194.10(n); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 601 & cmL a, r.n.l, citing inter alia Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, Art. 19(3Xd), Report of the International Law Commission, 2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 96, 31 U.N. 
G.A.O.R., Supp. No. 10, at 226 (1976). 
104. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, ArL 194(5). Ice-covered areas, governed by id., AIL 234, are an example 
of such sensitive environments. 4 NORDQuIST,supra n. 20, para. 194.10(0), noting that International Law Commission, 
Report ()11 the Work of the 42d Sessi()1l, ch.lV, para. 312, sec. C, item 2, AIL 22, Commentary, para. (2),45 U.N. G.A.O.R., 
Supp. No. 10 (1990), reprinted in 2(2) Y.B. In!'1 L. Comm'n 57 (1990) defines "ecosystem" as "an ecological unit ••• of 
living and non-living components that are interdependent and function as a community." 1982 LOS Convention, 
supra, does not define the term. 
lOS. 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, ArL 195; see also 4 NORDQUIST,supra n. 20, paras. 195.2, 195.6. 
106.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, AIL 196. 
107.4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 196.1, 196.7(a). 
108. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, AIL 197, partly based on Stockholm Declaration, supra n. 52, Recomm. 
92, 11 id. at 1456-57, and Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 
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Dec. 29,1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter London Dumping Convention]. 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 
20, para. 197.3. 
109. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 200.01; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 200.1-200.6, 
201.1-201.7; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 603(2). Freedom of the high seas includes the right to conduct 
scientific research, subject to coastal State continental shelf rights. 1982 LOS Convention, supra, Art. 87(1). It is 
generally accepted as a customary right. 1 BROWN, supra n. 33, at 429. 
110. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 202-06, based in pan on Stockholm Declaration, supra n. 52, 
Principles 16,21,11 id. at 1419-20; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 4332 (1994); 4 NORDQUIST, supra 
n. 20, paras. 20l.1-202.6(b), 203.1-203.5(c), 204.1-204.8(d), 205.1-205.6(c), 206.1-206.6{c). 
111.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 198. "IMO is as important in its particular fields ofinterest-maritime 
safety and protection of the marine environment-as is the UNEP at global leveL " BIRNIE & BoyLE, supra n. 28, at 53. 
112.4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para. 198.1; see also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 601, emt. e & r.n.4, citing 
inter alia Memorandum of Intent Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, Can.-U.S., 32 U.S.T. 2521; 
1274 U.N.T.S. 235. 
113. This "to some extent anticipates" 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 221. 4 NORDQUlST,supra n. 20, para. 
198.1. 
114. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 199; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, noting that High Seas 
Convention, supra n. 31, Art. 25(2), requires countries to cooperate with competent international organizations in 
measures to prevent radioactive materials contamination of the seas or airspace. The 1982 Convention, supra, covers 
a wider spectrum of required cooperation. 
115. This "to some extent anticipates" 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 221. 4 NORDQUlST,supra n. 23, para. 
198.1. 
116. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 207(1)-207(2), 208(1-208(3), 209(2), 211(2); see also 4 NORDQUIST, 
supra n. 20, paras. 207.7(a)-207.7(b), 208.10(a)-208.10(d), 209.10(a), 211.15(1); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 
603(lXa). As id. r.n. 7 shows, the United States, like many nations, has marine pollution legislation which may require 
amendment to align it with Convention standards. Such laws, if enacted worldwide, can evidence customary nortOs. 
BROWNUE, supra n. 30, at 5. 
117.4 NORDQUlST,supra n. 20, para. 208.10(a). 
118. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 210(1)-210(3), 210(6); see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para. 
210.11(b); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, § 603. National laws, such as those in id., r.n.7, can evidence custom. 
BROWNUE, supra n. 30, at 5. 
119. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 210(5); see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 210.11(c)-210.11(g), 
noting that London Dumping Convention, supra n. 108, Art. 4, requires prior approval. 
120. 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para. 210.11(g) & n.14, citing inter alia International Law Commission, Report on 
the lf70rk of lIS Thirty-First Session: Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 32, U.N. Doc. N34/194 (1979), reprinted in 
18 I.L.M. 1557, 1568, 1576 (1979), stating that these are not defenses if the offending country contributes to the 
occurrence of the situation of material responsibility. See also Commentary to Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
in International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Thirty-First Session, U.N. Doc. N34/10 & Corr. 1 (1979), 
reprinted in 2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 122-36 (1979). The practical experience is that jettisoned fuel dissipates quickly 
in the atmosphere and does not present an emergency. 4NoRDQUlST,supra, para. 210.11(g)&n.14.Restatement(Third), 
supra n. 30, sec. 603, cmt. g & r.n.8 discuss aircraft noxious and noise emissions. 
121.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Arts. 18(2}, 39(lXc);see also Territorial Sea Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 
14(3); CoLOMBos,supra n. 20, § 181 (customary law); 2 O'CoNNELL, supra n.19, at 853-858 (same). As NWP 9A,supra 
n. 30, paras. 1.4.1,2.3.1, 3.2, 3.2.2, 7.3.2, 7.3.7, demonstrate, this customary law of the sea nortO follows different 
principles during artOed conflict. See also Hague Convention (VI) Relating to Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at 
Outbreak of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, Art. 2, 205 Consol. T.S. 305, 312 [hereinafter Hague VI]; Hague Convention 
(Xlm Concerning Rights & Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, Art. 21, 36 Stat. 2415, 2431 
[hereinafter Hague XIII]; Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 28,1928, Art. 17,47, id. 1989,1993,135 L.N.T.S. 
187,204; Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14,1937,Art. 5,181 L.N.T.S. 135, 139; Stockholm Declaration Regarding Similar 
Rules ofNeutrality,May27,1938,Arts.4, 7,188id. 294,299,301,305,307,311,313,319,321,325,327; Oxford Manual, 
supra n. 30, Arts. 31, 34, 37, reprinted in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra n. 30, at 290, 292-93; San Remo Manual, supra 
n. 30, paras. 21 (Hague XIII rule); 136, Commentary 136.2 (Hague VI considered to be in disuetude); Commentary 
168.6 (Hague XIII rule); de Guttry, Commentary, in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra at 102, 109 (Hague VI oflimited 
usefulness); Schindler, Commentary, in id.o supra, at 211, 221 (Hague XIII restates custom, with minor exceptions). 
This is yet another example of the "other rules" principle in operation. See supra nn. 64-88 and accompanying text. 
122. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 207(3) (land-based pollution), 207(4) (seabed activities subject to 
national jurisdiction); see also U.N. Charter, Art. 52. 
123. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 207(4}, 208(5), 209(1), 210(4}, 211(1), 212(3). 
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124. /d., Arts. 211(3)-211(4); see also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 604(3). The Convention's negotiating 
history demonstrates that under it coastal States cannot require warships to give notice or get prior consent before 
entering the territorial sea on innocent passage. See generally RohCH & SMlTII, EXCESSIVE M!.RmME ClAIMS (Nav. War 
C. Int'l L. Stud., v. 66, 1994) at 154-60; 1 BROWN, supra n. 33, at 64-72. For principles governing innocent passage, 
which apply equally to merchantmen and warships, except that submarines must navigate on the surface and show 
their flag, see generally 1982 LOS Convention, supra, Arts. 17-26,45, 52(2). The Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 
U.S.C. secs. 1221-36 (1994), is a typical national statute regulating enforcement of safety and environmental measures 
in the territorial sea. A worldwide pattern of these kinds oflaws can evidence customary standards. BROWNUE, supra 
n.30,at5. 
125. These rules cannot apply to foreign ship design, construction, manning or equipment unless they effectuate 
generally accepted international rules or standards. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 19(2Xh), 21; see also 2 
NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, paras. 19.1-19.11, 21.1-21.12, noting some States' continued opposition to warships' right of 
innocent passage and linkage between 1982 LOS Convention, Arts. 21(1Xf), and 192, supra. The Art. 19(2) list is 
exclusive, although ill., An. 19(2)(1), ("any other activity not having a direct bearing on practice") couId be read 
expansively. See 2 NORDQUIST, supra, para. 19.11, citing Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law 
Governing Innocent Passage, Sept. 23, 1989, USSR-U.S., Art. 3, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1444, 1446 (1989) [hereinafter 
Uniform Interpretation], noting Russia has accepted this statement; NWP 9A, supra n. 30, para. 2.3.2.1. Aside from 
a special rule for ftshing craft, Territorial Sea Convention, supra n. 31, Arts. 4-5, uses a general reasonableness rule to 
define innocent passage. See also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 513 & cmts. a-e, hoi, & r.n.I-2, 6. For analysis 
of "other rules of international law" clauses, see supra nn. 64-88 and accompanying text. 
126. These ships must carry special documentation too. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 22(2), 23; see also 
4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 22.1-22.9, 23.1-23.9, noting link with 1982 LOS Convention, supra, Arts. 24(I)(b), 
25(3),227; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 513(2)(b) & cmt. d. Uniform Interpretation,supra n. 125, Arts. 5,20, 
clarifies the Russian text of the 1982 LOS Convention, supra, Art. 22, saying that coastal States may designate sea 
lanes and traffic separation schemes "where necessary to protect the safety of navigation." 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, 
para. 22.9. 
127.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 24; see also 2 NORDQUlST,supra n. 51,paras. 24.1-24.8, noting parallel 
language ("form or fact") in 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 25(3),42(2), 52(2), 227; Restatement (Third), 
supra n. 30, sec. 513(2) & emt. c; Clingan,Freedom a/Navigation in a Post-UNCLOS III Environment, in Symposium, 
supra n. 96 at 107, 111. 
128. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 25; see also 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 51,paras. 25.1-25.9, noting that 
Uniform Interpretation, supra n. 125, applies to Art. 25, taken directly from Territorial Sea Convention, supra n. 31, 
Arts. 16(1)-16(3); Restatement (Third),supra n. 30, sec. 513(2Xa) & cmt. c, which say there should beno discrimination 
among different countries' vessels during temporary suspension; it should apply to ships of all flags. 
129.2 NORDQUlST,supra n. 51, para. 25.1, citing Territorial Sea Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 16(3). 
130. See generally 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, paras. 25.1-25.9; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, secs. 513, cmt. c; 
601-04 state nothing to the contrary. 
131. U.N. Charter, An. 51; see also supra n. 72 and accompanying text. 
132. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 27-18; see also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sees. 457, r.n.7; 
461, emt. e; 513(2)(b) & cmt. C, e, h, & r.n. 2. 
133. 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 2(3); see also Territorial Sea Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 1(2); supra 
nn. 64-88 and accompanying text. 
134. In the case of archipelagic sea lanes, passage is subject to the right of an archipelagic State, as defined in the 
Convention, to designate sea lanes and air routes through its archipelagic waters and adjacent territorial sea. 1982 
LOS Convention,supra n. 39,Arts. 45-46, 52-53; compareid., Art. 25(3). Head Harbor Passage through Canadian waters 
to Passamaquoddy Bay, off Maine, is an example of this kind of strait. RoACH & SMITH,supra n.124, at 181; Alexander, 
International Straits, in LAW OF NAVAL OPERhTIONS, supra n. 30, at 91, 99. Innocent passage rules also apply to straits 
between an island of a State and that State's mainland, if a route exists seaward of the island through the high seas or 
an EEZ that is of similar convenience with navigational and hydrographic characteristics. 1982 LOS Convention, 
supra, Art. 38(1). The Straits of Messina, off Italy, is an example. RoACH & SMlTII,SUpra at 181; Alexander, Intemational 
Straits, in LAW OF NhVAL OPERhTIONS, surpa n. 30, at l00-{)1. Few countries qualify as archipelagic States under the 
Convention. SeegeneraUyill. at 131-32, citing 1982 LOS Convention,supra, Arts. 4647,49, 52-53; see also 2 NORDQUIST, 
supra n. 51, paras. 46.1-46.6(f), 47.147.9(m), 49.149.9(d), 52.1-52.7, 53.1-53.9(n). Similar construction should be given 
1982 LOS Convention, supra, An. 52(2), and its authority to temporarily suspend innocent passage through 
archipelagic waters. As for territorial sea innocent passage, which has broader application potential, see also supra n. 
125-31 and accompanying text. 
135.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 53; see also 2 NORDQUlST,supra n. 51,paras. 53.1-53.9(n); Restatement 
(Third), supra n. 30, sec. 513(4) & emt. k, r.n.4. 
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136. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 38(1), 45(1)(b), 52-54; id., Art. 54 incorporates by reference id., Arts. 
39-40,42,44; see also 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, paras. 54.1-54.7(b) and supra nn. 125-31 and accompanying text. Most 
commentators agree that Convention rules on nonsuspendable straits passage reflect eustom. See generally, Clingan, 
supra n. 127, at 117; Harlow, Comment, in Symposium, supra n. 96, at 125, 128; Oxman, Regime oj Warships, supra n. 
67, at 851-61; Schachte, Intemational Straits and Navigational Freedoms, 24 Ocean Deve!. & Int'l L. 179, 181-84 (1993). 
137. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 233, incorporating by reference id., Arts. 42(IXa)-(b), 236, would 
appear to apply, strictly speaking, to straits transit passage regimes because of references to Art. 42; the straits innocent 
passage regime, and provisions governing territorial sea innocent passage have no similar intervention provisions, 
although such might be inferred from coastal State authority to enact environmental laws that might include authority 
to intervene. Warships, naval auxiliaries, etc., have sovereign immunity as in the case of transit passage. See generally 
id., Arts. 17-32,45,236; S. Doc. 103-39, reprinted in 6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 11-15, 23, saying that by 
extension these principles apply to archipelagic sea lanes passage and straits passage. The U.S. Navy has taken the 
position that a straits passage regime also applies to approaches to straits. The Navy position that warships, operating 
in normal mode (i.e. submarines traversing these straits submerged), may employ formation steaming and conduct 
air operations as incidental to normal navigation practices, so long as there is no threat to the coastal State(s), is 
consistent with the transit passage regime. Alexander, supra n. 134 in LAw OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra n. 30, at 92; 
Clove, Submarine Navigation in International StrailS: A Legal Perspectiu, 39 Nav. L. Rev. 103, 105 (1990); Schachte, 
Intemational Straits, supra n. 136, at 184-86, but see Lowe, Commander's Handbook, supra n. 67, in LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS, supra on naval operations in transit straits. If this is accepted as practice, the environmental protection 
regime appurtenant to straits passage applies to this area too. The issue of straits passage for belligerents illustrates 
the interface of the LOS and the LOAC preserved by the "other rules" clauses of the law of the sea. See generally NWP 
9A,supra n. 30, paras. 2.3.3-2.3.3.2,2.5.1.1; San Remo Manual, supra n. 30, paras. 23-33; Mayama, The Influence oJthe 
Straits Transit Regime on the Law oj Neutrality at Sea, 26 Ocean Devel. & Int'l L. 1 (1995); supra nn. 64-88 and 
accompanying text. 
138.1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 31; compare Territorial Sea Convention, supra n. 31, Art. 24, which 
inter alia provides for a 12-mile zone. The contiguous zone's outer limit means that States asserting a territorial sea 
less than the full extent provided by the 1982 Convention, 12 miles, or under customary law for States party to the 
1958 Conventions, may declare a contiguous zone up to the limits permitted by whichever convention is in force for 
them. See also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 51I(b) & emt. Ie. 
139. See generally 2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, paras. 33.1-33.8(i). 
140.1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 303(1)-303(2) provides: 
1. States have the duty to protect objects of an archeological and historical nature found at sea and shall 
co-operate for this purpose. 
2 •••• rrlo control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in applying Article 33, presume that their 
removal in the contiguous zone ••• without its approval would result in an infringement within its territory 
or territorial sea of the laws and regulations referred to in that article. 
141. See generally 5 NORDQUIST, supra n. 47, paras. 303.1-303.10. 
142. Art. 303 also does not affect identifiable owners' rights, salvage law or other admiralty rules, or culrural 
exchange laws and practices. 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Arts. 303(3)-03(4). Under traditional admiralty law, 
shipwrecks and objects found at sea are a rmder's property, unless its national law or the law of the salvor provides 
otherwise. See generally Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 521, r.n.6; SCllOENBAUM, supra n. 22, ch. 14; S. Doc. 
103-39, supra n. 40, 6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch, Supp. No.1, at 51, citing U.S. legislation that may alter these rules. 
Title to warships or government aircraft is never lost until a flag State officially abandons or relinquishes it. If an 
aircraft or ship is caprured, title vests then in the captor State. NWP 9A,supra n. 30, paras. 2.1.2.2-2.1.2.3, 8.2.1; see 
also Agreement Concerning Wreck of C.S.S. Alabama, Oct. 3, 1989, Fr.-U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 11687_ 
143. See supra nn. 64-88 and accompanying text. 
144.5 NORDQUIST, supra n. 47, para. 303.10. 
145.1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 149. 
146. Id. supra n. 39, Arts. 55, 56(IXa), 56(IXbXiii)-56(c), 57-58, defining the EEZ as extending outward 200 
nautical miles from territorial sea baselines and providing that coastal States have "sovereign rights for •. " conserving 
and managing their natural resources, ••• living or non-living, of the waters subjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed 
and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, 
[e.g.] • •• production of energy from the water, currents and winds; [and] ••• jurisdiction as provided for in •.• this 
Convention [for] ••• protection and preservation of the marine environment; [and] other rights and duties provided 
for in this Convention." See also id., Art. 60, giving the coastal State exclusive rights and jurisdiction over artificial 
islands and other EEZ installations. ld., Arts. 61-72, expand upon standards for conservation and use of living 
resources, stocks occurring within two or more countries' EEZs, various kinds of sea life, and rights oflandlocked 
and geographically disadvantaged States.ld., Art. 73, declares standards for enforcing coastal State EEZ laws. See also 
2 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 55.1-55.1I(d), 56.1-56.11(e), 57.1-57.8(b), 58.1-58.10(f), 60.1-60.15(m), 61.1-61.12(k), 
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62.1-62.16(1}, 63.1-63.12(f), 64.1-64.9(f), 65.1-65.16(i), 66.1-66.9(g), 67.1-67.8(e), 68.1-68.5(b), 69.1-69.17(h), 
70.1-70.11(d), 71.1-71.9(c), 71.1-71.10(b), 73.1-73.10(b); S. Doc. 103-39,6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch Supp. No.l,at2S-27. 
As of 1992,86 States had EEZs; 20 more claimed fishing zones. The EEZ "is now widely considered to be a part of 
general international law." 2 NORDQUIST, supra, para. V.33; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 514, cmt. a. While 
id. sec. 514(1) generally follows Convention criteria as to EEZ sovereignty and jurisdiction, Source NOle says "authority" 
is used instead of "jurisdiction" because of the Restatement's different characterization of jurisdiction in other 
contexts; 1982 LOS Convention, supra, Arts. SS, 58, specifically referring to id., Arts. 87-115, which declare inler alia 
high seas freedoms of navigation which apply to the EEZ. States therefore cannot exclude warships on environmental 
grounds from their EEZ. 
147. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 211(5). A special qualification to this general rule is id., Art. 234, 
providing that coastal States may adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory laws for preventing, reducing and controlling 
pollution from ships in ice-covered areas to the limits of their EEZs where particularly severe climatic conditions and 
ice create obstructions or exceptional navigational hazards, "and pollution of the marine environment could cause 
major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance." Such laws must have "due regard to navigation 
and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. •.. " Territorial, and hence territorial sea, claims arc 
frozen as to Antarctica by the Antarctic Treaty, supra n. 68, Art. 4. For now, and unless there is a new Ice Age, Art. 
234 only applies to Arctic Sea rim States, e.g., the United States. S. Doc. 102-39,6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch Supp. No. 
1, at 24, noting that key States concerned, i.e. Canada, the USSR and the United States, negotiated Art. 234 to provide 
the basis for implementing provisions for commercial and private vessels in the 1970 Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act consistent with Art. 234 and other relevant Convention provisions while protecting "fundamental 
U.S. security interests" in exercising navigational rights and freedoms throughout the Arctic. See also 2 O'CoNNELL, 
supra n. 19, at 1022-2S. 
148. See supra nn. 96, 100, 119 and accompanyiog text for EEZ analysis. See also 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 
39, Arts. 76-78, 80, declaring that the shelf can extend outward the same distance, 200 nautical miles, as the EEl, 
along the ocean bottom, or to the edge of the continental margin, whichever is greater, but not over 350 miles; 2 
NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, paras. 76.1-76.18(m), 77.1-77.7(d), 78.1-78.8(d), 80.1-80.9, noting adaptation of Continental 
Shelf Convention, supra n. 31, Arts. 2-5; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 515. 
149. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 55, 56{I)(bXiii), 56(2), 58(3), 60(3), 60(7), 78-80, also employing a 
"must not infringe - unjustifiable interference" formula for shelf and high seas rights interfaces and a "reasonable 
exploration" - "may not impede" rule for interface of shelf and submarine cable and pipeline rights. See also 2 
NORDQUIST, supra n. 51, paras. 56.11(e)-56.11(f), S8.1O-S8.1O(f), 60.1S(f), 60.1S(j), 66.9(d), 78.S(c), 79.8(e), 80.9; 
Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sees. 514, cmt. e; 515(2). "Due regard" or similar phrases also appear in other 
provisions of the 1982 LOS Convention,supra, Art. 87(2), (due regard for others' high seas rights and freedoms, and 
for Area activities), and in Continental Shelf Convention, supra n. 31, Arts. 4-5, ("reasonable measures ••• , may not 
impede"; no "unjustifiable interference with navigation, fIShing," etc.); High Seas Convention, supra n. 31, Arts. 2, 
26(2) ("reasonable regard" for others' high seas freedoms); Territorial Sea Convention,supra n. 31,Art. 19(4) (balancing 
navigation interests with right of arrest for crimes committed in the territorial sea). 
150.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Arts. 58(1)-58(2),78, referring to id., Arts. 86-115; see also supra nn. 64-88 
and accompanying text for "other rules" analysis. 
151. 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, para. 211.15(b). 
152. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 213-14, 216, 222; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 
213.1-213.7(f), 214.l-214.7(c), 216.l-216.7(d), 222.1-222.8. 
153. Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 603; see also supra n. 97 and accompanying text. 
154. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 217-20, 223-24, 226-31, expanding on rules in the navigational 
articles, id., Arts. 21(IXf), 28(2), 56(1)(bXiii), 56(3), 60(1), SO; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 217.1-217.8G), 
218.1-21S(9Xh), 219.1-219.8(d), 220.1-220.11(n), 223.1-223.9(c), 224.1-224.7(e), 226.1-226.11(e), 227.1-227.7, 
228.1-228.11(h),229.1-229.5,230.1-230.9(c),231.1-231.9(c);Restatement(Third),supra n. 30,sees. 457, r.n.7; 461, cmt. 
e;512. 
155.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 22S;see also 4 NORDQUlST,supra n. 20, paras. 225.1-225.9; Restatement 
(Third), supra n. 30, sec. 513, cmt. e. 
156. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 232, 235; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 20, paras. 232.1-232.6{c), 
235.1-235.10(g); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 604, r.n.3. Article 235 was derived from the Stockholm 
Declaration, supra n. 52, Principle 56; 4 NORDQUIST, supra, para. 235.1. 
157. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 221; Charney, supra n. 47, at 892 n.79; see also 4 NORDQUIST, supra n. 
20, paras. 221.1-221.9(h); Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 603, r.n. 3, noting similar provisions in 1969 
Intervention Convention,supra n. 22,Art.l, and 1973 Intervention Protocol,supra n. 22, to which numerous countries 
are parry. TIF, supra n. 32, at 385; Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the 
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N.G.A. Res. 2749 (1970), para. 13(b), reprinted in 10 
I.L.M. 220, 223 (1971). 
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158. Cf. BIRNlB & BoyLE, supra n. 28, at 286; BROWNLIE, supra n. 30, at 5; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 
102(3), cmts. f, i, r.n.5. 
159. See supra nn. 4-6 and accompanying text. 
160. See supra nn. 64-88 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra nn. 10-11, 13-16 and accompanying text. 
162. Compare 1982 LOS Convention, supra n_ 39, Art. 236, with id., Arts. 42(5), 96, 110(1); see also High Seas 
Convention,supra n. 31,Arts. 8(1); 3 NORDQUlST,supra n. 67,paras. 95.1-96.6(c); 4id,supra n. 20, paras. 236.1-236.6(f). 
Warship and naval auxiliary immunity is an accepted rule ofinternational law. 3 id., para. 95.1; 4 id., para. 236.1. 
163. S. Doc. 103-39,supra n. 40, 6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 24. 
IM.E.g., Convention on Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, Arts. 1,13,1092 U.N.T.S. 280, 296, 298, 
among Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
165. Kuwait Regional Convention, supra n. 53, Art. 14; Red Sea Convention, supra n. 54, Art. 14. 
166. See supra nn. 46-49 and accompanying text. Other regional treaties say they are subject to present and future 
LOS conventions, e.g., Convention for Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16, 1976, Art. 
3(1),1102 U.N.T.S. 27,46, and its protocols. 
167. See supra nn. 31,40, 162 and accompanying text. 
168. Compare 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 94(4Xc), with High Seas Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 10. 
169. Compare 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 94(7), with High Seas Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 11(1); 
see also 3 NORDQUlST,supra n. 67, para. 94.8(k). 
170. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 122-23; 3 NORDQUIST, supra n. 67, at 344; see also id, para. 123.12(e), 
listing inter alia Kuwait Regional Convention and Red Sea Regional Convention, supra nn. 53-54 as among regional 
coordination agreements for semi·enclosed areas. 
171. Compare1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Art. 87(1), with High Seas Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 2; see also 
supra n. 67 and accompanying text. 
172. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 24O(d). Indeed, id., Art. 87(lXf), declares that the right to conduct 
scientific research is subject to rules in Parts VI and XIII of the Convention. Pan VI declares rules for the continental 
shelf, and Part XIII states general principles for protecting marine environment. See supra nn. 9, 92·123, 148-50 and 
accompanying text. Subject to other Convention provisions, States conducting research must give other countries 
reasonable opportunity to obtain information necessary to prevent and control damage to the health and safety of 
persons and to the marine environment. 1982 LOS Convention,supra, Art. 242. A research installation or equipment 
is subject to the same rules prescribed for conducting research. Id., Art. 258. See also 2 O'CoNNEt.L, supra n. 19, ch.26. 
Vessels collecting scientific data are protected from capture under the law of naval warfare during armed conflict; if 
they are engaged in data collection for likely military application, they are not so protected. San Remo Manual, supra 
n. 30, paras. 47(f), 136(e). 
173. Compare 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, Arts. 87(IXe), 116,with High Seas Convention, supra n. 31, Art. 
2; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 521(2Xc). 
174. S. Doc.l03·39,supra n. 40,6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch, Supp. No.1, at 27. 
175. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 116, incorporating id., Arts. 63(2), 64-67,118-20; compare Fishery 
Convention,supra n. 31, Arts. 1-8, 13; see also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 521, cmt. e; S. Doc. 103-39, supra 
n. 40, 6 U.S. Dep't St. Dispatch, Supp. No.1, at 27-28, listing treaties regulating or prohibiting high seas fIShing. 1982 
LOS Convention,supra, ArtS. 56,61-73, regulate EEZ fIShing. See also 3 NORDQUIST supra n. 67, paras. 116.1-116.9(g); 
Charney, supra n. 47, at 896·901. 
176.1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39,Art. 87; compare High Seas Convention,supra n. 31, Art. 2, declaring that 
a State exercising a high seas freedom through its vessels or aircraft must have "reasonable regard" for others' 
concurrrent exercises of those freedoms. 
177. With regard to fIShing, this statement is onlyttuewith respect to the high seas where no littoral State interests, 
e.g. those in an EEZ, apply. In the latter case, high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and other non·resource 
activities are preserved by the 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39. 
178.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39,Art. 87(2). 
179. Id., Art.1(IXl);see 2 NORDQUlST,supra n. 51, paras. 1.1-1.19, 1.26·1.31; Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 
523, cmt. b, declaring that id., sec. 523(IXa) recites a customary principle, that "[N]o State may claim or exercise 
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights over any pan of the sea-bed and subsoil beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction, or over its mineral resources, and no State or person may appropriate any part of that area ••• " Id., sec. 
523(IXb) recites the U.S. view of the law: 
••• unless prohibited by international agreement, a state may engage, or authorize any[one] to engage, 
in ••• exploration for and exploitation of that area, provided that such activities are conducted (i) without 
claiming or exercising sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights in any pan of that area, and (ii) with 
reasonable regard for the right of other states or persons to engage in similar activities and to exercise the 
freedoms of the high seas; ••• minerals [so] extracted ••• become the property of the mining State or person. 
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Id., cmL b. 
180. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 136. 140(1). The "common heritage" concept began with the 
Antarctic Treaty, supra n. 68, and continued with conventions related to outer space. Restatement (Third), supra n. 
30, sec. 523, cmL b & r.n.2 adopted the then U.S. position that deep seabed mining was a high seas freedom, rejecting 
the "common heritage" view in the Convention. However, if the Convention is accepted generally, "without dissent 
by .•• important ••. States, the sea-bed mining regime .• _ may become effective also as custom •••• " !d., sec. 523, 
cmLe. 
181. 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Art. 135; see also Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, secs. 521, cmt. i; 523. 
182.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, ArL 137(2). Id., Arts. 156-91, are constitutive provisions for the Authority; 
they would be modified by the Boat Agreement,supra n. 40, to amend Part XI of the Convention. See S. Doc. 103-39, 
supra n. 40, 6 U.S. Dep't SL Dispatch Supp. No.1, at 34-43. 
183.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39,Arts.14546. 
184. Id., ArL 149; see also supra nn. 65-78 and accompanying text for the relationship between this provision and 
the contiguous zone and the "other rules of intemationallaw" clauses found elsewhere in the Convention. 
185. Compare 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 147(1), 147(2Xb), 147(c), with id., Arts. 60, 80; see also 
Restatement (Third), supra n. 30, sec. 523(lXbXii) & cmL d, stating a more solicitous view of high seas freedoms. 
186.1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, ArL 138, referring to id., Arts. 133-91. 
187. Compare id., Art. 141,21, with id., Arts. 88,24O(a). 
188. See supra nn. 64-88 and accompanying texL 
189. MAHMOUDI, THE LAw OF DEEP SEA-BED MINING (1987) at 173-75. 
190. The treaties disclaim any intention to affect parties' rights or claims as to their maritime jurisdiction 
"established in conformity with intemationallaw." Kuwait Regional Convention, supra n. 53, Arts. 2, IS; Red Sea 
Convention, supra n. 54, Arts. 2, 15. The protocols allow application to ports, harbors, estuaries, bays and lagoons if 
there is a "marine emergency," and if the particular country so decides. "Marine emergency" is defined broadly. 
Kuwait Protocol, supra n. 53, Arts. 1(2), 4. Red Sea Protocol, supra n. 54, Arts. 1(2),4. These treaties implement 
environmental policies of 1982 LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Arts. 122-23; see also supra n. 170 and accompanying 
text. 
191. Compare Kuwait Regional Convention, supra n. 53, Art. 1 (a), with Red Sea Convention, supra n. 54, ArL 1(2). 
192. Kuwait Regional Convention, supra n. 53, Arts. 3(a), 4-7; Red Sea Convention, supra n. 54, Arts. 3(1), 4-8, 
which adds a pledge to prevent, abate and combat pollution "resulting from other human activities." 
193. See generally Kuwait Protocol, supra n. 53; Red Sea Protocol, supra n. 54. 
194. Compare Kuwait ProtocoI,supra n. 53, Art. 1(2), with Red Sea Protocol,supra n. 54, Art. 1(2). 
195. See supra nn. 157-59 and accompanying texL 
196. The Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre, an administrative agency, also must be notified. Kuwait Protocol, 
supra n. 53, Arts. 3, 10; Red Sea Protocol,supra n. 54, Arts. 3, 7(2). 
197. Kuwait Protocol,supra n. 53, ArL 1(4); Red Sea Protocol,supra n. 54, Art. 1(4). 
198. See supra nn. 157-59 and accompanying text. 
199. See also supra n. 72 and accompanying texL 
200. See supra nn. 52-54 and accompanying texL 
201. Neither Iran nor Iraq was party to the 1958 LOS Conventions,supra n. 31. The customary principle of "other 
rules ofintemationallaw," restated in these agreements and the 1982 LOS Convention,supra n. 39, did apply, however. 
See supra nn. 64-88 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra nn. 80-83 and accompanying texL 
203. See supra nn. 191-94 and accompanying text. 
204. See supra n. 60 and accompanying texL 
205. Okorodudu-Fubara, supra n. 2, at 197; see also supra nn. 58-61 and accompanying texL 
206. See supra nn. 4-6 and accompanying texL 
207. Kuwait Protocol, supra n. 53, arL 1(2). 
208See supra n. 4 and accompanying texL 
209. See supra nn. 8-9, 18 and accompanying texL 
210. The U.N. Security Council deplored attacks on merchant shipping. If these Resolutions had been obeyed, 
they would have resulted in no more attacks on these vessels and therefore no more pollution of the Gulffrom this 
cause. These resolutions covered a specific point, i.e. freedom of navigation, and therefore should not be construed as 
applying special Charter law to the exclusion of conventional norms, to these situations. See supra n. 8 and 
accompanying texL 
211. See supra nn. 80·83 and accompanying texL 
212. See supra nn. 8, 46 and accompanying texL 
213. See supra n. 62 and accompanying text. 
214. See supra nn. 10-11,13-16 and accompanying text; see also Okorodudu-Fubara, supra n. 2, at 196. 
215. See supra n. 55 and accompanying text. 
216. See supra n. 54 and accompanying text. 
217. See supra nn. 103,142, 149, 176, 185 and accompanying text. 
218.See supra nn. 132,137,150,162-167 and accompanying text. 
219. See supra nn. 64-88, 121, 133, 142-43, 160, 186-89, 201 and accompanying text. 
220. See supra nn. 68-72, 186-89 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra nn. 157-59, 195-99 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra nn. 4-6 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra nn. 190-216 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra n. 46 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra nn. 190-216 and accompanying text. 
226. See supra nn. 55,215-16 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra nn. 46-49 and accompanying text. 
228. Compare LOS Convention, supra n. 39, Part II.c.1 with Part II.c.2. 
229. See mpra nn. 46-49 and accompanying text. 
230. See supra nn. 60, 62-63,131 and accompanying text. 
231.See mpra nn. 132, 137, 150, 162-67,218 and accompanying text. 
232. See mpra nn. 64-88, 121,133,142-42,160,186-89,201,219-20 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra nn. 103,142, 149, 176-78, 185,217,228 and accompanying text. 
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